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Introduction
Saddam Hussein had no idea that his invasion of Kuwait on August 2,
1990 would result in his Gulf War defeat. The legacy of Hussein's
expansionist desires are well documented: the destruction of Iraq's military
forces, the most diverse and largest group of nations to unite in a military
campaign since World War I1, and a solid groundwork for a Middle East peace
plan. All with only twenty-six American casualties. But the legacy of the
Gulf War hits far closer to home than this. Hundreds of American companies
that had contracted to export goods to Iraq have yet to be paid. Their export
contracts were financed through irrevocable letters of credit issued by Iraqi
banks and confirmed by American banks. Today these companies are fighting
I The author has found the phrase's use in: Barbara Demick, PA. Furnace Maker Caught Between
Iraq and a Hard Place, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Feb. 9, 1993, at 10A.
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an enemy far greater than Saddam Hussein. They are fighting the "mother of
all battles" against American banks, the U.S. courts, and the U.S. government.
Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, thousands of American companies
manufactured goods for export to Iraq. They protected themselves by entering
into letters of credit confirmed by U.S. banks.2 In most cases, the issuing Iraqi
bank deposited money in the American confirming bank's account. This
money was either earmarked for paying the letter of credit beneficiary or for
reimbursing the confirming bank once it honored the letter of credit. On
August 2, 1990, these sellers were in various stages of completing their
contracts. Sometimes a seller presented the proper shipping documents to the
confirming bank and was a wire transfer away from payment. Other times a
seller was almost finished manufacturing his products and was about to
deliver them to an international shipper or freight forwarder. Then as part of
America's response to Iraq's invasion, President Bush froze all Iraqi assets in
the U.S. Confirming banks then claimed they could not pay letter of credit
beneficiaries from the frozen Iraqi accounts earmarked for payment, lest they
violate Bush's freezing orders.
This comment explores litigation where American exporters, with varying
success, sought payment from American confirming banks and/or the
unlocking of frozen Iraqi assets. Part I will argue that the U.S. judiciary
responded to the competing interests of the Bush (and later Clinton)
Administrations, the Treasury Department, the banking community, and the
exporting community by upholding long-standing letter of credit legal
doctrines, thereby siding with the exporters against the banks. However,
courts did not go so far as to interfere with the Treasury's control over the
Iraqi assets freeze program. The judicial balancing of these interests reflected
both the law and the best practical solution to a no-win situation. Part H will
2 A brief review of letter of credit transactions may be in order. Generally a letter of credit
involves the following parties and transactions. A buyer and seller agree to a contract. The seller,
concerned about payment, requires as part of the transaction a letter of credit-a promise, irrevocable for
a stated period of time, to pay the seller upon the presentation of certain documents evidencing that the
goods have been shipped to the buyer. The buyer then negotiates with its bank (in which it is an account
party) to issue this letter of credit. Often in international transactions the seller (the letter of credit
beneficiary) requires that an American bank confirm the letter of credit. When the seller has completed the
goods and delivers them to a shipper, he receives in return shipping documents signifying delivery to the
shipper. The seller then presents these documents to the confirming bank, which is obligated to pay
pursuant to the letter of credit. The obligation to pay upon presentment of proper shipping documents is
independent of whether the goods conform to the contract. Subsequently the confirming bank will be
reimbursed from the issuing bank. In most situations the confirming bank requires the issuing bank to
deposit the amount owed on the letter of credit in an account in its bank.
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examine proposed Congressional bills that will satisfy American claimants
with the frozen Iraqi assets. Part III will argue that the Treasury Department's
behavior in this litigation reflected domestic political concerns and
institutional biases rather than the neutral management of an assets freeze
regime.
Part I: Letter of Credit Litigation
A. The Assets Freeze Regime
In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush imposed
sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("IEEPA")3 and the U.N. Security Council mandates.4 Bush signed Executive
Order Nos. 12,7225 and 12,723,6 which invoked the authority of IEEPA and
dictated that "all property and interests in property of the Government of Iraq,
its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of
Iraq" be blocked.7 The blocking applied to property within the United States
or in control of U.S. persons!
At the same time, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 661,'
which required U.N. members to impose economic sanctions on Iraq. Among
these sanctions included a prohibition against providing funds "or any other
financial or economic resources" to Iraq." President Bush later signed
Executive Order 12,72411 which "aligned U.S. sanctions against Iraq with the
terms of the [U.N. R]esolution" and continued blocking assets of the Iraqi
Government and its agencies. 2
The party responsible for managing this frozen assets program is the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"). OFAC
3 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977). See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), and U.S. v. Arch
Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993), for discussions as to whether the IEEPA is a constitutionally
permissible delegation.
4 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCrIONS AND U.S. TRADE 153 (Supp. 1996).
5 Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990).
6 Exec. Order No. 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,805 (1990).
7 Exec. Order No. 12,722 § 1, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990).
s MALLOY, supra note 4, at 155.
9 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg. at §§ 3(a)-(c) and 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990).
10 Id. at 4.
11 Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990).
12 MALLOY, supra note 4, at 161.
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implemented the Executive Orders through the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations
("ISRs").13 These Regulations dictate that "no such property or interests in
property of the [Government of Iraq] can be transferred, paid, exported,
withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in, unless licensed by OFAC."'4 One with a
judgment against an Iraqi entity cannot execute that judgment without a
license from OFAC-"[u]nless licensed or authorized ... any attachment,
judgment, lien... is null and void."' 5
A plaintiff must also obtain an OFAC license just to bring a suit involving
frozen Iraqi assets.16 OFAC has considerable discretion to grant these licenses,
and usually granted them liberally. 7 This is the result of several decisions
heavily scrutinizing OFAC's denial of a license to sue. Courts feel that for
OFAC to deny a license to sue an Iraqi entity invades the power of the
judiciary. " Moreover, when one plaintiff brought suit without obtaining the
proper license, OFAC deemed it "not terribly significant."' 9 But OFAC is
extremely recalcitrant in granting licenses to execute a judgment against Iraqi
property.
This prohibition on the transfer of any asset in which Iraq had a property
interest apparently prevented the honoring of letters of credit. Certain
beneficiaries had presented the appropriate shipping documents to their
confirming banks but had yet to receive payment when Bush froze Iraqi assets.
Other exporters obtained draws on the letters of credit and were in the process
of finishing manufacturing goods for export. Once Iraqi assets (i.e., the
issuing Iraqi banks' deposits in the confirming banks) were frozen, the
confirming banks claimed that they could not honor these letters of credit
without violating the freeze orders. Even if a beneficiary complied with the
letter of credit by timely presenting the conforming shipping documents to the
13 Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 570 (1991).
14 MA.LOY, supra note 4, at 171.
15 Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 575.202(b)-(e) (1991).
16 While this has been the case in practice, there is no express statutory language so requiring. It
has been argued that OFAC is interpreting statutory language used in the Iranian assets freeze regime,
"[u]nless authorized by a license expressly referring to this section, the acquisition, transfer... in any
security (or evidence thereof) registered or inscribed in the name of any Iranian entity is prohibited ....
"31 C.F.R. § 535.202 (1991). Douglas M. Hottle, Unblocking Frozen Assets-A Simple Solution, 31 DUQ.
L REV. 329, 333 n.19 (1993).
17 See 31 C.F.R. § 575.202 (1991).
is Dean Witter v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 361-62 (1lth Cir. 1984); National Airmotive v. Iran,
499 F.Supp 401,405 n.9 (D.D.C. 1980).
19 Ellen Pollack and Wade Lambert, U.S. Concern Sues Iraq Raising Issues of Deciding Postwar
Claims, WALL ST. J., March 11, 1991, at 8.
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confirming U.S. bank, OFAC's position was that to honor the letter of credit
by paying out of the earmarked funds was a transfer of property in violation
of the freeze orders.
Unlike the United States, the United Nations quickly enacted its own
claims regime. The U.N. adopted Resolution 687 on April 3, 199 1,2 which
enumerated the exact nature of its compensation regime. The U.N. created a
Compensation Fund headed by a Governing Council. The Fund would be
financed through U.N. sponsored sales of Iraqi oil and petroleum products,
and the Fund would only accept consolidated claims by individual
governments on their own behalf and on behalf of their citizens. These
claims would be evaluated at the domestic level by each country's appropriate
governing body, and then each government would present the claims in
consolidated form to the Compensation Commission. The Commission would
allocate lump-sum payments to countries who would then distribute the funds
to individual claimants.22 This was never an avenue of compensation for the
American letter of credit beneficiaries. This is because the Fund would only
address claims for loss, damage or injury that resulted directly from Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. U.N. Resolution 687 stated that "[d]ebts and obligations
of Iraq arising prior to August 2, 1990, are to be addressed through the normal
mechanisms," meaning those claimants only had recourse with their individual
governments. 23 This meant that any pre-war contract claim, of which the
American letter of credit exporters had many, would be redressed either in the
U.S. courts or through appropriate Congressional legislation.
B. Obstacles
American exporters were not content with knowing that they might have
a recognized claim against Iraq. They did not want to wait until Congress
enacted claims legislation or a created a claims tribunal. Moreover, these
beneficiaries knew that it could be years before Congress passed claims
legislation. For example, Cuban assets have been frozen for twenty-five years,
20 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981rd mtg., at 16-19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
21 Massimo Galli, Sue or Lose: An Agenda for American Corporations and Companies Seeking
Compensation From Iraq, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 241,243. At the rate of the U.N. plan, it will take
twenty to thirty years for Iraqi oil sales to pay off those claims. Charles Brower, International Law:
Credibility Depends on Iraqi Reparations, MIDDLE EAST EXEC. REPORTS (May 1992) at 12.
22 Galli, supra note 21, at 245, 248.
23 Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981rd mtg., at 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
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and yet there is still no Cuban claims legislation.' Finally, the beneficiaries
knew how little Iraqi assets there were to pay off all the reported claims.
Therefore, the exporters sought immediate payment, rather than a small
percentage of their claim later.25
In contrast, when President Carter froze Iranian assets in response to the
hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, U.S. claimants were less urgent
to recover because of the amount of frozen assets available. In 1979, there
were nearly $10 billion in Iranian funds in the United States, however, in
1990 there were only $1.3 billion frozen Iraqi assets in the United States and
$4 billion worldwide. Almost immediately, there were $80 billion worth of
claims against Iraq for pre-war economic damages and $100-200 billion for
post-war damages.26 Claimants would likely receive fractions of their claims.
This fostered a "race to the courthouse," and due to the success of several
early plaintiffs, there was hope that letter of credit beneficiaries could recover
their claims in full.2
While the U.N. Claims Compensation Fund gave the American exporters
no help, the United States government chipped away at assets available to pay
them. The U.N. enacted Resolution 778, which created a pool of money
donated by member states for humanitarian efforts in Iraq.2" The resolution
limited individual state contributions to $200 million. The U.S. contributed
the $200 million maximum, even though the only other contributors were
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Bush Administration transferred the $200
million from blocked Iraqi accounts to the Federal Reserve, and then
transferred $50 million to the UN.29
There were other problems facing the beneficiaries. To recover against
a confirming bank that refused to honor a letter of credit, a beneficiary had to
obtain an OFAC license to bring suit. Even if it won the suit, it would then
have to obtain a second OFAC license to execute the judgment on Iraqi
funds.3 If an Iraqi defendant did not appear, and the beneficiary moved for
a default judgment, OFAC often intervened on behalf of the Iraqi defendant
and against the American exporter; OFAC claimed that it had an interest in the
2 See generally, Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
25 Galli, supra note 21, at 251, 254.
2 Id. at 248.
2 See, e.g., Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry of Indus. and Minerals, No. 90-2269, 1992 WL
415256 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1992) rev'd, 71 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
n Res. 778, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 31174 mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES1778 (1992).
29 57 CONG. REc. H622-02, H623 (Feb. 16, 1993).
30 See generally 31 C.F.R. §§ 575.305-313 (1991).
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management of the frozen assets." OFAC's stated reasons for intervention
were that default judgments compromised U.S. efforts to create an effective
claims resolution process, and that if U.S. claimants bypassed the system and
sought redress in the courts, no money would be left when Congress
ultimately enacts claims legislation.32 Another procedural hurdle was the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"),33 which enumerated detailed
requirements for serving process on a foreign entity, including venue and
evidentiary requirements in default judgment motions.34 OFAC often
intervened on behalf of the non-appearing Iraqi entity claiming that the
beneficiary had not complied with the FSIA. Most importantly, suits against
Iraq had to be commercial in nature, or Iraq had to waive its sovereign
immunity. Although Iraq waived its sovereign immunity by accepting U.N.
Resolution 687 as a condition of the Gulf War cease fire, that waiver only
related to compensation for claims of injury directly resulting from the
invasion of Kuwait. It was of no help for the exporters/plaintiffs.35
C. Discussion
While each letter of credit case had its own facts, certain general themes
remained consistent. For instance, the sellers often claimed that they
complied with the letter of credit by presenting their conforming documents
to the appropriate banking institution before the Iraqi invasion. The
confirming banks claimed that to honor the letters of credit would violate the
prohibition on the transfer of assets in which Iraq had a property interest.36 In
addition OFAC asserted that its intervention on behalf of the Iraqi entities was
to protect the frozen assets until Congress enacted claims legislation. For
instance, if a court found that a letter of credit beneficiary made proper
presentment or complied with its contractual obligations, the court ordered the
31 OFAC has made its position known through the Justice Department which filed "Statements of
Interest" in virtually all of these cases. Galli, supra note 21, at 241, 258 and n.61. See also, e.g.,
International Housing Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank, 712 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Commercial Bank of
Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238 (2nd Cir. 1994). Justice or State Department "statements of interest"
consist of a "written policy position taken by the appropriate department concerning the litigation; often
these positions are politically motivated. Douglas M. Hottle, Unblocking Frozen Assets-A Simple
Solution, 31 Duq. L. Rev. 329, 332 n.17.
32 Hottle, supra note 31, at 332 n.17.
33 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et. seq. (1972).
34 Id.
35 Galli, supra note 21, at 245, 252-53.
3 See, e.g., Engel Indus. v. First Am. Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D.D.C. June 2, 1992).
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confirming bank to honor the letter of credit from its non-Iraqi assets. If a
beneficiary brought suit directly against a non-appearing Iraqi entity, a court
might enter a default judgment, including some substantial punitive damage
awards if fraud was involved.37 However, the courts did not compel OFAC
to grant the plaintiff a license to execute that judgment against frozen Iraqi
assets. Rather, the courts deferred to the administrative rulings of OFAC.
The courts' use of several legal principles including the independence
doctrine," the fraud-in-the-transaction principle,39 the strict compliance
doctrine,' and a Chevron" rationale, resulted in a consistent line of cases.
As an initial matter, when a letter of credit beneficiary applies to OFAC
for a license to sue and OFAC refuses to grant such a license, can the
beneficiary bring suit against OFAC (1) to obtain an OFAC license to sue, or
(2) to unlock assets frozen pursuant to the IEEPA 42 Tagle v Regan answered
this question.43
In Tagle, heirs of a deceased Cuban national sought the release of estate
funds frozen in 1963 pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.' The
heirs and the funds were in the United States, but a third heir still remained in
Cuba. The court released estate funds to which the American heirs were
entitled. As part of its holding, the court stated that:
if the assets are wholly or substantially owned by citizens and
residents of the United States they should be unblocked, since it is
possible that such assets may be placed in a fund at some future date
and used to pay the claims of American citizens against the Cuban
37 See, e.g., Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238 (2nd Cir. 1994); Dibrell
Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Rafidain Bank, No. CIV.A.93-0993-LFO, 1994 WL 324331 (D.D.C. June 15, 1994);
First City, Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, No. CIV.90-7360-JSM, 1992 WL 296434 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 1992); National Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K. v. Rafidain Bank, No. CIV. 93-3324-RPP, 1994 WL
376037 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1994).
38 See, e.g., Semetex Corp. v. UBAF Arab Am. Bank, 853 F. Supp. 759, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
39 See, e.g., Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Rockwell Int'l
Sys. Inc. v. Citibank S.A., 719 F.2d 583, 589 (2d Cir. 1983).
40 Engel, 798 F. Supp. at 15.
41 See, e.g., Consarc 27 F.3d at 701 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984)).
42 The same question is relevant to a blocking order pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act,
the precursor to the IEEPA.
41 Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
44 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515 (19._.), n.1. These Regulations were issued
pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. 5(b) (19...
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government. This would be tantamount to using the property of one
U.S. citizen to pay the claim of another U.S. citizen.45
Even though Tagle was not explicitly used as precedent in the letter of
credit context, it does establish two important principles. First, it is possible
to obtain a court order requiring OFAC to grant a license to release frozen
assets. Second, courts are much more willing to grant access to frozen funds
if American entities have significant property interests in those funds, or the
foreign government entities to which the sanctions are addressed have
negligible property interests in those funds.' Tagle also illustrates the legal
concern that property legitimately belonging to one American citizen should
not be used to satisfy the claims of another American citizen. While Tagle
was an estate case, this theme is also relevant in the letter of credit context.
The reason why these exporters required letter of credit financing was to shift
the burden of non-payment to the banks, i.e., "pay now, argue later." However,
OFAC and the Administration favor claims legislation resembling a
bankruptcy regime rather than a piecemeal, litigious solution. The U.S.
government, through OFAC, wants to partially satisfy all claims against Iraq
but at the expense of undermining the raison d'etre of letter of credit
financing. The fact that Tagle has not been mentioned in any of the letter of
credit cases may explain why OFAC has never been ordered to grant a license
to execute a judgment against blocked Iraqi funds.
In reviewing these letter of credit cases, the courts seem to have blanced
the interests of the parties while simultaneously adhering to the law. As a
result of this balancing test, the courts are able to manipulate the case law in
favor of either party. For instance, the courts sometimes hold that incorrect
flight information on shipping documents is not a "discrepancy" but merely
"non-conforming."'47
45 Tagle, 643 F.2d at 1061 (discussing Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1975), quoting
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACr, 22 U.S.C. 1643 et. seq.,))
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 3581, 3585. The court went on to hold that the operative factor making
the account a "blocked account of a decedent of which a designated national had an interest" was that the
decedent's nationality, rather than the third heir's nationality made the difference. In other words, it is only
the interest of the decedent in the estate, and not the heirs' interest, which prevents intestate succession.
To deny a license to the decedent's heirs would be arbitrary and baseless. Thus the court ordered OFAC
to grant the heirs a license. Tagle, 643 F.2d at 1064.
46 See, e.g., Nielson v. Secretary of the Treas., 424 F.2d 833, 842 (1970) (where Cuban refugees
who owned 3/4 of a Cuban corporation could not unfreeze the corporation's assets held in the United
States).
47 Semetex Corp. v. UBAF Arab Am. Bank, 853 F. Supp. 759,770 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Other times, repudiation is termed anticipatory breach rather than
unjustifiable breach because of force majeure.4 While the courts have neither
made new law governing letters of credit nor reallocated the risks inherent in
these transactions, the courts have re-interpreted certain legalisms to reach
their holdings. Thus it appears that the holdings of these cases are really
based upon the economic, political, and legal concerns of the various groups
concerned. Fortunately, a "realpolitik" compromise happens to conform to the
"proper" legal result. Some might argue that this is coincidental, but others
would argue that this makes perfect sense because that is what the law is
supposed to do. If it did not properly balance the relevant interests, then the
law would be ineffective. If the law is not leading to the most economically
efficient result, then it should be changed.
For analytical purposes, these cases should be distinguished according to
whether the beneficiary properly presented its shipping documents.
Presentment is very crucial because it often determines whether a beneficiary
is paid.





ngel Medcon - Iraqi Agency
LOC = Letter of Credit
Engel Industries, Inc. v. First American Bank49 ("Engel r') involved a
complicated letter of credit transaction. On May 23, 1990, Engel contracted
to sell machinery to Medcon, an American middleman, who would later sell
the equipment to an Iraqi entity. Medcon opened an irrevocable letter of
credit in favor of Engel at First American Bank ("FAB") for approximately
$272,000. Pursuant to the contract, Engel drew a ten percent down payment
of the amount of the letter of credit on July 27, 1990. Six days later Iraq
invaded Kuwait and Bush signed Executive Order 12,722. On August 8,
1990, Medcon informed Engel that it was rescinding the contract due to force
4 Engel Indus. v. First Am. Bank, N.A. 798 F. Supp. 9, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1992).
49 Engel, 798 F. Supp. at 14.
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majeure because the final sale to the Iraq company fell through. FAB also
demanded the return of the ten percent draw. Engel mitigated its damages by
completing the machinery, but Medcon refused Engel's presentment of its
shipping documents.
Engel then brought suit against Medcon and FAB. Medcon claimed it
was excused from performance because, in order for FAB to honor the letter
of credit, FAB would have to violate the freeze orders. The court dismissed
this argument by referring to an opinion letter issued by OFAC. OFAC stated
that the assets freeze never prohibited the presentment or acceptance of
documents, and that the Medcon-Engel contract was "incidental to a domestic
transaction in unblocked property[; OFAC] would permit payment by [FAB]
upon a court finding that all [letter of credit] conditions to payment by [FAB]
were complied with."5  The court held that Medcon's rescission was
anticipatory breach and that Engel was justified in mitigating its damages by
completing performance.51 The contract could not be voided by a claim of
commercial impracticability because Medcon did not comply with state law
by informing Engel of why it could not perform its obligations.52 The court
also held that FAB anticipatorily breached the letter of credit by refusing to
honor it.53 The court noted that FAB had been free to request a specific
license from OFAC to pay Engel, and that FAB's actions were nothing more
than an attempt to avoid its responsibilities.54 Because FAB and Medcon
prevented Engel's proper presentment, they were estopped from claiming that
presentment was not pursuant to the letter of credit.
The court noted that without letters of credit, a seller assumes the risk that
a buyer will not perform its obligations. To rule for FAB would force sellers
to "engage in exhaustive credit investigations and otherwise devise needlessly
complex and prohibitively expensive financing arrangements .... Engel
would not have engaged in this transaction without the benefit of a letter of
credit or its equivalent."55 The court further noted that while a bank's only
protection is the requirement that documents strictly comply with the letter of
credit, "to honor First American's defense would be to carry the concept of
strict compliance to an extreme."
56
so Id. at 12.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 13; See generally U.C.C. § 2-616.
53 Engel, 798 F. Supp. at 13.
54 Id. at 14.
55 Id. at 15.
56 Id. at 16.
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The Engel I court confirmed long-standing contract and letter of credit law
to reach its result. The analysis was easier because OFAC's opinion letter
treated the entire transaction as a domestic matter, in which Iraq had no
property interest. However, the same court faced a much more difficult
question in the third party complaint filed by FAB ("Engel I/").57
Engel Industries v. First American Bank, N.A. (Engel H)
Issued
Issued FAB UBAF LOC
LCNote\ ,, Confired LOCI
Engel Contract Medcon Contract Iraqi Agency
Medcon also entered into a second contract to resell Engel's machinery
to an Iraqi agency. It issued a note to FAB to pay any money drawn by Engel
on the original letter of credit. Medcon also required the Iraqi agency to open
its own letter of credit. This second letter of credit was issued by the Central
Bank of Iraq ("CBr') and confirmed by the UBAF Arab American Bank
("UBAF"). FAB then sued Medcon and UBAF for reimbursement of the ten
percent advance to Engel. The court ordered Medcon to reimburse FAB.
Medcon argued that if the freeze orders did not prohibit it from performing its
contract with Engel in Engel I, then those same orders should not prohibit
UBAF from honoring the letter of credit to Medcon.
The court agreed with OFAC that CBI's collateral posted with UBAF was
blocked property.58 But the court also declared that just because CBI's
collateral was blocked did not prevent Medcon from obtaining a judgment
against UBAF, for UBAF confirmed the letter of credit and undertook its own
liability.59 Because Medicon obtained a letter of credit to insure against this
sort of liability, it should receive the same benefit of its bargain as did Engel
57 Engel Indus. v. First Am. Bank, N.A., 803 F. Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1992).
59 Id. at 426.
59 Id. at 428.
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in Engel L Thus the court noted that while Medcon could not recover against
the Iraqi purchaser, it could recover against UBAF's non-Iraqi assets. The
Engel H court reached a solution that most courts faced with this litigation
have followed: if a seller contracts to shift the risk of loss to a bank, the bank
should absorb this liability irrespective of whether the bank is reimbursed. To
deny the beneficiaries recovery puts an end to letters of credit and drastically
inhibits the American export market.
Engel II's holding also illustrates the independence principle, which
dictates that a letter of credit represents an obligation independent of the
contract for sale between buyer and seller.' The letter of credit becomes the
seller's obligation to present strictly conforming shipping documents, and the
bank has an obligation to pay upon that presentment. The buyer's complaint
that the goods do not conform to the contract does not excuse the bank from
paying upon proper presentment of the shipping documents. When the seller
properly presents his documents, a confirming bank must pay the seller
irrespective of whether that bank is reimbursed by the issuing bank.








Another case where a letter of credit beneficiary recovered from a bank's
non-Iraqi assets was Semetex Corp. v. UBAF Arab American Bank.6 Semetex
involved a 1988 contract for Semetex to sell equipment to Al-Mansour, a
state-owned Iraqi factory. The Central Bank of Iraq ("CBI") issued an
irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Al-Mansour, which was confirmed by
UBAF Bank ("UBAF'). CBI also gave the UBAF cash collateral for the letter
60 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
61 Semetex Corp. v. UBAF Arab Am. Bank, 853 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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of credit. Semetex took a $720,000 draw on the letter of credit, from which
UBAF assigned to a component part manufacturer. The letter of credit
required that UBAF pay upon the proper presentment of various documents.
Semetex presented shipping documents to UBAF in July 1990, but they were
rejected because of certain irregularities. With the goods in transit in the U.S.,
shipping documents were delivered to UBAF on August 1, 1990. The
following day, the freeze orders came into effect, and UBAF refused to honor
the letter of credit.
Semetex sought a license from OFAC so that UBAF could pay Semetex
from CBI's collatetal deposit.62 UBAF assisted in the license application by
confirming that Semetex's documents satisfied the letter of credit's
requirements.63 OFAC denied the license request because the Iraqi Sanctions
Regulations only allowed payment for goods exported before the invasion.'
Semetex then applied for a second license to bring suit against UBAF to seek
payment from UBAF's own assets rather than from the blocked Iraqi assets,
which OFAC granted. Needless to say, UBAF did not assist in this license
request.
The court first had to decide whether ordering UBAF to pay Semetex from
its non-Iraqi assets, pursuant to its confirmation of CBI's letter of credit, was
a transfer of property in which Iraq had an interest.65 The court emphasized
the importance of the independence principle, noting that "letters of credit
'represent separate contractual undertakings that are, in legal contemplation,
wholly distinct from whatever performance they ultimately secure."' 66 Thus,
a confirming bank must pay upon proper demand even though "the beneficiary
has breached the underlying contract, even though the insolvency of the
account party renders reimbursement impossible, and not withstanding
supervening illegality, impossibility, war or insurrection."'67 The court
concluded that neither AI-Mansour nor CBI had a property interest in UBAF's
62 Id. at 766.
63 Id. (quoting the confirmation letter of May 7, 1991 by UBAF counsel Isamn Salah).
6 Id. at 766.
65 Id. at 768. This letter of credit was governed by the "Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce, [which is a] ... compilation
of internationally accepted commercial practices, which may be incorporated into the private law of a
contract between parties." Id. at 769.
Id. at 770 (quoting Rockwell Int'l Systems, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 587 (2nd. Cir.
1983)).
67 Id. (citations omitted).
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non-Iraqi assets, and so their interests were not dependent upon whether
UBAF paid from its non-Iraqi assets.68
The court also had to decide whether minor discrepancies in the shipping
documents (certain misrepresentations of flight information) constituted
sufficient fraud to justify UBAF's refusal to honor the letter of credit.
Semetex argued that UBAF waived its fraud defense by stating that the
documents complied with the letter of credit in its letter to OFAC regarding
the first license application. The court determined that there was insufficient
evidence of fraud.69 The court recognized that fraud is a well established
exception to a bank's absolute duty to pay a letter of credit beneficiary when
presented with conforming documents.7" But the court also recognized that
such a defense is a narrow one and only available when intentional fraud is
shown.7 Improper performance or breach of warranty is insufficient. Rather,
there must be an "outright fraudulent practice."72 Not only was there no
evidence of fraudulent intent, but any misrepresentations were immaterial.73
The court concluded that the parties should end up with the rights they
bargained for. Semetex contracted out of its risk of loss through the letter of
credit, and UBAF, having admitted that the shipping documents complied with
the letter of credit, had to pay from its non-Iraqi funds.
Semetex demonstrates that courts will award beneficiaries the right to
collect from a confirming bank's non-Iraqi funds in the proper circumstances.
The courts agree with exporters that "property interest of Iraq" does not
include a confirmed letter of credit. Therefore, if a confirming bank has
confirmed a letter of credit, the blocking orders should have no affect on an
exporter's ability to recover. Even OFAC agrees with this. While OFAC
granted Semetex' s second license request to seek recovery from UBAF's non-
Iraqi assets, OFAC denied Semetex's initial request for access to CBI's
blocked collateral account, even though UBAF, as the confirming bank, joined
in the initial license application.
6 ld. at 771. The court relied upon the reasoning of Engel I and Centrifugal which both held in
similar instances that the account party had no property interest in whether the confirming bank paid from
its non-Iraqi assets.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 773. See generally KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10 (2d
Cir. 1979).
71 Semetex, 853 F. Supp. at 773 (citing All Service Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. v.
Banco Bamerindus do Brazil, S.A., 921 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir.1990)).
72 Id. at 773-74 (quoting Rockwell Int'l Systems, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 588-89 (2d.
Cir. 1983)).
73 Id. at 775.
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Semetex also reaffirmed the importance of letter of credit transactions in
international trade. However, an analysis of the court's opinion shows that the
court manipulated legal doctrine, precedent and principles to fashion its result.
The court could have steadfastly held that Semetex's discrepancies in the
presented documents were material enough to constitute a fraud. While it
required a showing of intentional fraud, the court took its requirement from
standby letter of credit cases involving Iranian buyers.74 The court could have
limited the intentional fraud requirement to the facts of those cases or to
standby letters of credit in general. It appears from Semetex's facts that
Semetex's freight forwarder intentionally used the wrong flight information,
albeit only for the sake of convenience, and not to make UBAF approve a non-
conforming product. However, the court chose to ignore these indiscrepancies
and interpret the facts otherwise. The only explanation for this is that the
court's decision is outcome determinative. The court's overriding objective
was to uphold long-standing letter of credit principles and efficiently allocate
the risk of loss in letter of credit transactions.
Nonetheless, both Semetex and Engel II clearly show that courts will order
confirming American banks to honor letters of credit from their non-frozen
funds. These cases maintain both the integrity of the assets freeze regime, and
the rights for which the parties contracted. But what if the facts were slightly
changed? What if the letter of credit beneficiary took a draw on a bank's
confirmation of the letter of credit, and the invasion cut short the contract?
Could the beneficiary keep the draw even though it did not perform its
contractual obligations to manufacture the goods, let alone deliver shipping
documents to the confirming bank? This question was answered in
Centrifugal Casting Machine Co., v. American. Bank & Trust Co.,7 where the
court decided who had rights to a down payment draw on a letter of credit.
74 See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Systems, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583 (2d. Cir. 1983).
75 Centrifugal Casting Machine Co., v. American Bank & Trust Co., 966 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir.
1992).
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sLOC = Standby Letter of Credit
Prior to the invasion, Centrifugal contracted with the Iraqi State
Machinery Trading Company ("SMTC") to produce and deliver pipe plant
equipment. The Central Bank of Iraq ("CBI') issued a letter of credit in favor
of Centrifugal, and it was confirmed by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro's
Atlanta branch ("BNL"). 76 Centrifugal had BNL issue a standby letter of
credit77 to American Bank of Tulsa ("ABT") in favor of Iraqi Rafidain Bank
("Rafidain"). Rafidain could collect on this standby letter of credit should
Centrifugal breach the contract. Centrifugal also drew a 10% down payment
on the letter of credit and deposited that money with ABT in case ABT had to
honor the standby letter of credit.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, it was clear that the contract could not be
performed. Centrifugal, BNL and ABT brought suit over who had rights to
the 10% draw on the letter of credit. In addition, OFAC intervened in the suit
and claimed that Centrifugal's deposit at ABT was blocked property under the
76 See supra notes 174, 221 and accompanying text (discussing BNL's role in funneling money
to Iraq through illegal loans).
'n The court explains the nature of a standby letter of credit as follows: "[The] beneficiary of an
of ordinary letter [of credit] may draw upon it simply by presenting documents that show that the
beneficiary has performed and is entitled to the funds. In contrast, a 'stand-by' letter requires documents
that show that the customer has defaulted on some obligation, thereby triggering the beneficiary's right to
draw down on the letter." Centrifugal Casting Machine Co., v. American Bank & Trust Co., 966 F.2d
1348, 1350 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting Wood v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 888 F.2d 313, 317 (3d
Cir.1989)).
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freeze orders, since Iraq still had a property interest in the down payment
draw.78 The district court ruled that ABT was not liable on the standby letter
of credit because no one made an appropriate claim prior to its expiration date.
Since it was not liable, ABT interpled the Centrifugal deposit. Thereafter the
parties reached a settlement agreement and the court ordered ABT to disperse
the money according to that agreement. Presumably most of it would go to
Centrifugal.79 However, OFAC appealed the court order, claiming that the
interpled Centrifugal deposit was property in which an Iraqi entity had an
interest.
On appeal, the court recognized the goals of an assets freeze, including
punishing Iraq by denying it the ability to transact with Americans, using
assets as bargaining chips, and compensating U.S. claims from those assets.80
The court held that to deny Iraq an asset in which it never had a property
interest did not further these goals." OFAC argued that Centrifugal breached
the contract by not completing the goods, and therefore Iraq still had a
property interest in its 10% draw on the letter of credit. The court stated that
such an argument ignored the legal relationships of the parties created by their
financing mechanisms.
The court noted the importance of letters of credit and of the
independence principle, stating that "courts have concluded that the whole
purpose of a letter of credit would be defeated by examining the merits of the
underlying contract dispute to determine whether the letter should be paid."82
The court rejected OFAC's argument that Iraq had a property interest in the
draw by holding that OFAC "makes a breach of contract claim on behalf of
Iraq that Iraq has never made, creates a remedy for the contracting parties in
derogation of the remedy they themselves provided [, i.e., the standby letter
of credit,] and most importantly, disregards the controlling legal principles
with respect to letters of credit."83
In effect the court held that the Iraqi entities, SMTC and Rafidain, had two
remedies for Centrifugal's breach: (a) the standby letter of credit, which had
already expired; and (b) a breach of contract suit. But the letter of credit in
effect allowed Centrifugal to keep the down payment pending litigation.
78 Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1350.
79 Since the settlement agreement is confidential, one can only assume that most of the money went
to Centrifugal.
80 Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1350-51.
91 Id. at 1351.
82 Id. at 1352-53.
93 Id. at 1353.
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Since only BNL had expended any funds in the transaction, there could be no
Iraqi property interest in the letter of credit draw. The court also noted that
an account party on a letter of credit transaction does not gain a property
interest in the beneficiary's payment simply because of the beneficiary's
alleged breach of the underlying contract. To hold so would circumvent the
independence principle. "The beneficiary's bargained for right to retain the
payment pending contract litigation would be effectively defeated .... The
national interest is not furthered by creating a property interest out of
conditions that would not otherwise generate such an interest, particularly
when we must do so at the expense of a critical and unique device of
international trade. ' 4
Engel II, Semetex, and Centrifugal each involved letter of credit
beneficiaries disputing with confirming American banks. But what if the
transaction at issue did not involve a confirming bank? What if the Iraqi
purchaser had an Iraqi bank issue the letter of credit directly to the American
seller-exporter, with only an American advising bank to pass the seller's
shipping documents along to the issuing Iraqi bank? Could the American
seller seek relief from the advising bank? Alternatively, what if the parties
envisioned the issuing Iraqi bank directing payment to the beneficiary from an
account with an American bank that served as a reimbursing bank, and then,
after the Iraqi purchaser received the goods, but before the issuing Iraqi bank
authorized payment to the letter of credit beneficiary, Iraq invaded Kuwait and
President Bush signed Executive Order 12722?85 These issues were recently
explored in Bergerco Canada v. Iraqi State Company for Food Stuff
Trading.6
Id. at 1353-54.
5 See supra notes 5 through 11 and accompanying text.
8 924 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1996), rev'd., 129 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Royal Bank of Canada Rasheed Bank
Advisement
Iraqi State
B ergerco Contract Company
In February, 1990, Bergerco Canada, a Canadian corporation, and its
American affiliate, Bergerco US (collectively, "Bergerco"), contracted with
the Iraqi State Company for Food and Trading ("Iraqi State Company") for the
sale and delivery of two large shipments of food from Canada to Iraq. 7 The
Iraqi State Company had its Iraqi bank, Rasheed Bank ("Rasheed"), issue an
irrevocable letter of credit for four million dollars to Bergerco.88 The Royal
Bank of Canada ("Royal Bank") served as an advising bank89 and the Bank of
New York ("BNY") served as the reimbursing bank.90 Bergerco made an
initial shipment, which the Iraqi State Company paid without incident.9' Then
Bergerco made a second shipment which arrived in Aqaba, Jordan on June 25,
87 Id. at 255.
:8 Id.
An advising bank is usually a bank located in the country of the shipper or letter of credit
beneficiary who acts as an information transmitter, accepting the requisite shipping documents and
delivering them to the issuing or confirming bank. Id. at 258. (citing Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (1983), at Art. 8; U.C.C. §§ 5-103(l)(e); 5-107).
90 Bergerco, 924 F. Supp. at 255. A reimbursing bank is usually a bank that is authorized by the
issuing bank to pay under the letter of credit. However, unless the issuing bank has requested (and the
reimbursing bank has given) an irrevocable promise to pay, the reimbursing bank is not required to pay
under the letter of credit. This contrasts with the transactions in Engel II, Semetex, and Centrifugal, where
the reimbursing bank was actually a confirming bank. See supra notes 58 to 84 and accompanying text.
A confirming bank agrees to make payment from its own funds, or from the issuing bank's pledged funds
on account with the confirming bank, upon a proper request to the confirming bank or upon instructions
from the issuing bank. Bergerco, 924 F. Supp. at 259 (citing Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (1983), at Art. 10(b); U.C.C. § 5-107).
91 Bergerco, 924 F. Supp. at 255.
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1990, just seven days before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.92 The Iraqi State
Company accepted this shipment, and Bergerco presented the requisite
shipping documents to Royal Bank.93 Royal Bank forwarded the shipping
documents to Rasheed Bank, who received and accepted them on July 10,
1990.94 However, it was not until September, 1990, one month after Iraq
invaded Kuwait and President Bush signed Executive Order 12722, that
Rasheed Bank instructed BNY to pay Bergerco. 95 However, by this time,
BNY was prohibited from transferring any money from Rasheed' s account.96
Approximately two months later, Bergerco filed suit against the Iraqi State
Company, OFAC,97 BNY, and Royal Bank.98 Bergerco and OFAC soon filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.
Bergerco argued that it was entitled to a release of the funds held at BNY.
Bergerco claimed that Iraq (through Rasheed) had no interest in the funds at
BNY because Bergerco had already presented the requisite shipping
documents to Rasheed before President Bush signed Executive Order 12722,
which froze Rasheed' s account.99 Bergerco claimed that if Iraq no longer had
an interest in the funds, then Executive Order 12722 did not apply. The court
agreed that the issue was whether Iraq had an interest in the BNY account on
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. The Court determined that Rasheed Bank, as a result of accepting the shipping documents,
became obligated under the terms of its letter of credit to pay Bergerco. In fact, Bergerco sought and
obtained a default judgment against the Iraqi State Company and Rasheed Bank. Id. at 257.
95 Id. at 256; see also supra notes 5 through 11 and accompanying text.
Although the letter of credit documents speak of Royal Bank paying the contract price to
Bergerco and then obtaining reimbursement from Rasheed's bank account at BNY, the final transaction
was slightly different. Once Rasheed accepted the shipping documents, Royal Bank, instead of paying
Bergerco and then seeking reimbursement, requested that BNY transfer the contract price from Rasheed's
account at BNY to Royal Bank's New York City branch. However, at that point, President Bush had
already signed Executive Order 12722, which prevented BNY from releasing any of Rasheed Bank's funds.
Id. at 255-56.
Moreover, although the parties disputed when BNY first learned that it was to pay Bergerco, all
agreed that BNY did not learn of Rasheed's direction until after the invasion and Executive Order 12722,
at which time BNY could no longer transfer Rasheed's funds. Id. at 256.
96 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
97 Id. at 256. Bergerco first requested a license from OFAC that would permit BNY to pay the
amounts due Bergerco from Rasheed's account at BNY, which OFAC denied. Id. Bergerco sought a
declaration against OFAC that it is entitled to a license under the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations to be paid
from Rasheed's account at BNY.
9 Id. at 256.
99 Id. at 257. See supra note 11.
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August 2, 1990, but disagreed that Iraq had no interest."'t The court first held
that Rasheed's acceptance of the requisite shipping documents on July 10,
1997 immediately obligated Rasheed to pay the contract price, and this
obligation was reflected in the court's default judgment entered against
Rasheed and the Iraqi State Company.'O° However, the court held that
Rasheed's acceptance of these documents did not entitle Bergerco to
Rasheed's BNY account.0 2 This was because BNY, as a reimbursing bank,
was merely authorized to pay in accordance with the letter of credit, but unlike
a confirming bank, was not obligated to do so. 0 3 Moreover, Rasheed never
instructed BNY to honor Bergerco's claim until after the freeze orders were
in effect." As the court explained, "[a]ny time prior to payment by [BNY],
Rasheed Bank retained every right to transfer the funds from its account.
Unless and until the funds were transferred, Rasheed Bank's interest remained
not only viable, but paramount."'0 5 Once the freeze orders were in effect,
BNY could no longer release the funds to Bergerco.'0
6
Bergerco also argued that Royal Bank made a reimbursement request to
BNY in one particular piece of correspondence on July 11, 1990, which
Bergerco claimed was sufficient to divest Iraq of its interest in the funds. The
court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the evidence was
insufficient to establish even the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
that this piece of correspondence qualified as a request for reimbursement.0 7
Second, and more importantly, even if Royal Bank submitted a proper and
timely request, BNY had no obligation to reimburse the Royal Bank as a
matter of law, because BNY was not a confirming bank.'08
Finally, Bergerco argued that OFAC's regulations, upon which OFAC
relied in denying Bergerco a license which would allow BNY to pay Bergerco
100 Bergerco, 924 F. Supp. at 260.
101 Id. at 260. See supra note 162.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 259-260. See supra note 158.
104 Id. at 260.
105 Id. at 262.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 261.
108 Id. at 261-62 (citing Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (1983), at Arts.
10(b) and 1 l(c)). The court also distinguished Centrifugal on the ground that it involved a confirming bank
that paid the beneficiary prior to August 2, 1990. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The court
stated that ifBNY "had confirmed the letter of credit and paid Bergerco (via [Royal Bank]) prior to August
2, 1990... Iraq would no longer have an interest in the funds in its account." (citing Centrifugal, 966 F.2d
at 1353).
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from Rasheed's account, violated the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act."° Specifically, Bergerco argued that OFAC should have applied
an earlier version of its regulations to Bergerco' s license request which were
in effect at the time of Bergerco's application, and that for OFAC to apply
subsequently created regulations was an impermissible retroactive
application."0 The court disagreed with most of Bergerco's points, but did
find that OFAC should have decided Bergerco's license request under the
earlier version of its regulations in effect at the time of Bergerco's
application."' The court remanded the matter to OFAC to reconsider
Bergerco's license request under the earlier version of the regulations.
However, OFAC appealed the district court's order. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that the earlier version of OFAC's regulations did not create a
"right" in Bergerco, who therefore could not claim that OFAC's retroactive
19 Id. at 257. See supra note 3.
110 Id. at 264.
II An analysis of Bergerco's arguments that OFAC exceeded its authority in promulgating its
regulations under the IEEPA, and misapplied those regulations, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Regarding which version of OFAC's regulations should have applied, OFAC regulations state
that funds in a blocked account, defined as "any account or property in which the Government of Iraq has
an interest," 31 C.F.R. § 575.301, may be transferred or withdrawn, inter alia, "pursuant to an authorization
or license from OFAC authorizing such action." 31 C.F.R. § 575.201(a). OFAC originally implemented
General License 7, which stated:
specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis to permit payment, from a blocked account
or otherwise, of amounts owed to or for the benefit of a U.S. person for goods or services exported
by a U.S. person or from the United States prior to the effective date of the blocking order, August
2, 1990.
OFAC General License No. 7 (August 15, 1990). See Bergerco, 924 F. Supp. at 265. After Bergerco
submitted its application for a license, but before OFAC made a final decision, OFAC amended General
License No. 7 to read:
[s]pecific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis to permit payment involving an irrevocable
letter of credit issued or confirmed by a U.S. bank, or a letter of credit reimbursement confirmed by
a U.S. bank, from a blocked account or otherwise, of amounts owed to or for the benefit of a person
with respect to goods or services exported prior to the effective date.
OFAC General icense No. 7, as amended (October 18, 1990). 31 C.F.R. § 575.510(a).
The Court found that the original General license No. 7 should have applied to OFAC's
decision to grant Bergerco a license to allow BNY to transfer Rasheed's funds to Bergerco. Bergerco, 924
F. Supp. at 267-69. However, OFAC decided (and denied) Bergerco's request under the amended General
License No. 7, which did not allow OFAC to even consider granting a license unless a U.S. bank confirmed
the relevant letter of credit, Id at 264-65. Because under the original General License No. 7, Bergerco may
have been entitled to a license, the court remanded the matter to OFAC to reconsider Bergerco's
application. Id. at 269. Cf Banque San Paolo v. Iraqi State Company for Food Stuff Trading, 1996 WL
735505 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that where the confirming bank was not a United States bank, OFAC
regulations, allowing for a license to exempt a transaction from the ISR's purview, were inapplicable).
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application of its own regulations improperly infringed on Bergerco's "right"
to a license.1
2
The Bergerco court, like the Engel II, Semetex, and Centrifugal courts,
ruled in accordance with long-standing letter of credit principles. Bergerco
refused to allow a letter of credit beneficiary to have access to funds to which
it was not entitled. Bergerco contracted with the Iraqi State Company and
decided not to require that there be a confirming United States bank involved
in the transaction. As a result, Bergerco assumed the risk that the Iraqi State
Company and the Rasheed Bank would not pay. Even though the Royal Bank,
as an advising bank, and BNY, as a reimbursing bank, were willing to
complete the transaction, they could not do so in the face of Executive Order
12722. The court correctly refused to shift the risk of loss away from
Bergerco. Bergerco was left with only a default judgment against Rasheed
and the Iraqi State Company. These disputes differed whether the beneficiary
sought payment from the confirming bank or vice versa. However, what if a
beneficiary could not bring suit against the confirming bank? What if the
beneficiary had neither drawn on the letter of credit (such that it could wait to
be sued by the confirming bank) nor completed the goods (such that it could
seek a court order that the confirming bank honor the letter of credit)? In these
circumstances, the beneficiary's only choice would be to sue the Iraqi
purchaser directly. Many letter of credit beneficiaries have done so and
obtained default judgments, but then OFAC has not granted them licenses to
execute their judgments. They are instead forced to wait to file claims in an
ultimate claims legislation regime. However, in Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi
Ministry of Industry and Minerals,1 3 one beneficiary sought further relief. It
requested the court to order OFAC to grant it a license allowing it to execute
its judgment against Iraqi frozen assets.
112 Bergerco Canada v. United States Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 129
F.3d 189, 193-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A more detailed analysis of the administrative procedure and
constitutional aspects of which version of OFAC's regulations apply, and whether OFAC's retroactive
application of the amended General License No. 7 was appropriate, is beyond the scope of this Article.
13 27 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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5. Consare Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals
BNY
Reinbursement








In May 1989 Consarc contracted with the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and
Minerals ("IMIM") to build three custom-made furnaces for manufacturing
prosthetics. IMIM had Rafidain Bank issue a letter of credit in favor of
Consarc for $6.4 million, which was advised' 4 by the Pittsburgh National
Bank ("PNB"). Rafidain entered into a second contract with the Bank of New
York ("BNY") where BNY would reimburse PNB if PNB honored the letter
of credit and paid Consarc upon the proper presentment of shipping
documents." 5 Rafidain earmarked money in its BNY account to reimburse
BNY if BNY paid PNB. IIM also made a direct down payment to Consarc
for $1.1 million. To secure this down payment, Consarc had PNB issue a
standby letter of credit payable to Rafidain if Consarc breached the contract.
As part of its application for an export license, Consarc included
certification from IvILIM that the furnaces would not be used for nuclear or
military purposes. Shortly before shipment, however, the Department of
"4 PNB, as an advising bank, would not incur legal liability if it did not pay upon the presentment
of shipping documents; it could simply pass the shipping documents along to Rafidain. Although PNB
would only advise the letter of credit, if it paid Consarc the $6.4 upon the proper presentment of the
appropriate shipping documents, then it would be reimbursed by Rafidain.
"5 This transaction, is similar to Royal Bank's advisement and reimbursement by Bank of New
York, and is called a "confirmed reimbursement credit". Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 702
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Defense notified the Customs Service that IMIM actually intended to use the
furnaces in its nuclear weapons program. The Commerce Department revoked
the export licenses. Shortly thereafter Iraq invaded Kuwait and President
Bush instituted the assets freeze program.
Consarc brought suit against IMIM and Rafidain bank seeking damages
for breach of contract. OFAC granted Consarc a license to seek monetary
damages but did not allow "the transfer of blocked [frozen] funds, or entry or
execution of any judgment."' 16 Neither Rafidain nor IMIM appeared and the
district court entered a default judgment. The court declared that Consarc was
entitled to the blocked account at BNY because IMIM, by virtue of its fraud
and breach, lost its legal interest in the funds prior to the freeze order. The
court also held that PNB was not liable on the standby letter of credit and that
Consarc rightly owned the down payment. The court awarded Consarc $6
million in compensatory damages and $55 million'in punitive damages.'
7
Initially one must ask why Consarc did not sue the confirming banks
(PNB and BNY), as did the beneficiaries in Semetex and Centrifugal, or as the
beneficiary in Bergerco tried to do, for it would seem easiest to recover from
BNY's or PNB's non-Iraqi assets. The answer is two-fold. First, although
Consarc had delivered the furnaces to the shipper, it never had the opportunity
to present its shipping documents. Perhaps the shipper had not signed the
proper documents, or perhaps the documents were void when the Commerce
Department revoked Consarc' s export license. Second, even if Consarc had
the opportunity to present shipping documents, neither PNB nor BNY ever
assumed liability if Rafidain failed to pay. PNB served as an advising bank
and only had to deliver the documents to the issuing bank. A confilrming bank
is obligated to pay upon presentment and then seek reimbursement from the
issuing bank. PNB had the option to pay Consarc upon proper presentment.
Moreover, BNY's liability derived from PNB's liability, for it only had to
reimburse PNB if PNB honored the letter of credit. BNY's responsibilities
never ripened because PNB had not yet made any payment. Consarc, as a
potential third party beneficiary, could not sue because the condition
precedent in the contract-presentment-never happened.
After the court's default judgment against IMIM and Rafidain, OFAC
issued two directive licenses. One required Consarc hold onto the furnaces
and to deposit the proceeds from the sale of one furnace in a frozen account.
116 Id. at 698 (quoting the OFAC license).
117 Id. at 699. See also, Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry of Indust. & Minerals, No. 90-2269-SS,
1991 WL 534917 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1991).
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OFAC determined that the furnaces were blocked property pursuant to the
Iraqi Sanctions Regulations. OFAC's second license prohibited the transfer
of the $6.4 million frozen BNY account. Moreover, OFAC filed a "Statement
of Interest of the United States" and moved to modify and/or vacate the
default judgment, claiming that it violated the assets freeze order.' Consarc
filed a supplemental complaint against OFAC, seeking: (1) an injunction
against OFAC's directive licenses, and (2) an order allowing Consarc to
execute against the blocked Rafidain account at BNY. The court held that
title to the blocked account already transferred to Consarc before the freeze
orders, and therefore OFAC could not freeze it because Iraq had no property
interest in it. Specifically, the court held that,
Consarc fulfilled its obligations under the [c]ontract; the actual
shipment of the furnaces to Iraq was prevented by Iraq's fraudulent
actions and the U.S. Government's intervention . . . .Therefore,
having fulfilled its end of the bargain, the blocked funds in Rafidain's
account passed to Consarc... [and IMIM] and Rafidain had no right
to, or interest in, those funds on August 2, 1990 or thereafter."9
The court ordered OFAC to issue a license allowing Consarc to execute on the
blocked account at the BNY, enjoined the United States from transferring or
disposing of the blocked account, and ordered that the furnaces and proceeds
thereof were properly frozen under the ISRs. 2° OFAC appealed.
The Circuit Court dismissed OFAC's untimely appeal of the district
court's order extinguishing Iraq's property interest in the standby letter of
credit.' 2' However, the court determined that the district court's order
allowing Consarc to execute on the frozen assets was a "transfer" of Iraqi
property under § 575.317 of the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations. 2 2  The key
inquiry was whether this transfer "deprived Iraq of 'property or interests in
property' that it held on the date of the freeze order."'
123
118 Id. at 699.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 699 (referring to the district court's order in Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry of Indust. &
Minerals, No. 90-2269-SS, 1992 WL 415256 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1992)).
121 Id. at 700.
122 Namely, and most importantly, that "no property or interests in property of the Government of
Iraq that are in the United States... may be transferred." ISRs, 31 C.F.R. § 575.201(a) (1997); See also,
Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
123 Consarc, 27 F.3d at 701.
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Consarc argued that this issue was governed by New York state law, and
that the letter of credit created a trust with a condition subsequent
(presentment of the shipping documents), and the revocation of the export
licenses made the condition illegal and void. Since state law mandated that
a voided trust automatically becomes the property of the beneficiary, Consarc
claimed that at the time of the invasion Iraq had no interest in the BNY
account. 24 Consarc was not making the trust argument to show that it had
exclusive rights to the BNY account. Rather, it was making this argument to
show that Iraq had no rights to the BNY account. Thus Consarc, like any
other judgment creditor, could execute its judgment on those funds without
violating the ISRs. OFAC argued the court should apply federal common law
of international letters of credit, and that the executive orders, IEEPA, and the
ISRs all define "property" as including letters of credit.
The court overruled the district court and held that OFAC had the
discretion to define "property interests" as it wished, subject to deferential
judicial review. 25 The Emergency Powers Act declared that the President had
the power to "prohibit any.., transfer [of] ... any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof had any interest."' 26 The President
properly delegated his power to define these terms to the Secretary of the
Treasury and OFAC. 127 The court decided it should defer to the ISRs in the
absence of contradictory statutory language or pure unreasonableness."2 Here
OFAC's definition of property as including letters of credit survived judicial
review. 29 Finally, the court rejected Consarc's argument that the "fraud in the
transaction" principle should include the concept that an account party's fraud
in the underlying sales contract allows a beneficiary to draw on a letter of
credit without presenting conforming documents. 30 As of the date of the
124 Id.
12 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984)). One should query
whether a citation to Chevron is an appropriate reference. It is built on the assumption that OFAC is the
best entity to determine whether it has the proper authority to administer the statute.
The court also notes that New York State property law would be important in an action in the
Court of Claims if Consarc argued that OFAC's application of the Emergency Powers Act was a
constitutional taking of Consarc's property that requires compensation. But so long as inverse
condemnation is available, Consarc's request for injunctive relief does not lie against a statutorily
authorized action. Consarc, 27 F.3d at 701 n.5.
126 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l)(B) (1977).
127 See supra note 10.
128 Consarc, 27 F.3d at 701 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984)).
129 Id. at 702.
130 Id.
BETWEEN IRAQ AND A HARD PLACE
freeze orders, Iraq had a reversionary interest in the funds irrespective of
whether the revocation of the export licenses excused Consarc from
complying with the letter of credit. 3 '
Before it was reversed on appeal, Consarc radically changed letter of
credit law. While the appeal was pending, Consarc exemplified how to
circumvent an assets freeze regime by executing against blocked property held
in an American bank without involving the confirming bank. Consarc enabled
a seller who complied with a contract for sale, but not the letter of credit, to
recover against the buyer if the buyer prevented the seller's performance of its
letter of credit obligations. For example, suppose that some foreign conflict
results in a freeze order that halts the performance of an export contract.
Normally before presentment is made, a beneficiary has no right to payment
because it has not complied with the letter of credit. If the district court
opinion was upheld, then a beneficiary could claim that before the freeze
order, the foreign entity had no property interest in the letter of credit
(assuming the beneficiary performed the underlying contract). Perhaps one
could expand the concept of fraud as used in Consarc to include a buyer's
knowledge of an impeding foreign conflict when it enters a contract. Then
courts might allow a non-presenting beneficiary to bypass the confirming
bank's funds and go right to the frozen assets earmarked for reimbursing the
confirming bank. Instead, with the reversal of the district court, the appellate
court gave OFAC the discretion to determine how to define "Iraqi property."
On remand, the district court ruled that if Consarc did not get the blocked
accounts held at the BNY, then Consarc should get title to the furnaces,
because the contract was effectively void.'33 Moreover, the court held that
Consarc could keep the proceeds from the sale of one of the furnaces and sell
131 Id.
132 This case is peculiar in that the facts never spell out whether presentment was ever made. It was
probably not made because once the Department of Defense withdrew Consarc's export license,
presentment became impossible. However, in a conclusory fashion, the court noted "[e]ven on Consarc's
view... the funds would have reverted to Rafidain when the letter of credit expired unless Consarc had
made a timely (albeit non conforming) demand. In fact Consarc made no demand of any kind until January
22, 1991. Consarc, 27 F.3d at 702. But earlier, in reciting the facts, the court stated "[the letter of credit]
obligated Rafidain to pay Consarc the named amount if and only if Consarc presented shipping documents
showing that the furnaces had been exported to Iraq. Consarc's right to draw on the letter [of credit]
expired on February 1, 1991." Consarc, 27 F.3d at 698. Why the court did not expound on the fact that
apparently Consarc did make a proper demand, while the letter of credit was irrevocable, is unclear.
133 Consar Corp. v. United States Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 871 F.
Supp. 1463, 1465-66 (D.D.C. 1994).
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the other one. 34 Consarc had to place the $6.4 million contract price in a
blocked account, but the court allowed Consarc to have a claim against that
account. 135 Not to be outdone, OFAC even appealed this order. OFAC first
objected to the fact that Consarc placed the $6.4 million into a blocked
account in a different bank account than Rafidain's original BNY account.
36
Moreover, OFAC objected to the district court's vacation of OFAC's blocking
order which blocked the one unsold furnace and the proceeds from the second
furnace. 37 On appeal, the court held that Consarc would have to place the
$6.4 million back into Rafidain's account at BNY, and that Consarc would
only have a general claim against Iraq and not against the specific BNY
account. 3 Moreover, the court held that, pursuant to IEEPA and the ISR's,
Iraq still held an interest in the furnaces, which were goods specially
manufactured for export to Iraq. 39 Therefore, the court ordered that the
district court permit OFAC to block both the remaining furnace and the
proceeds from the sale of the other furnace." 4°
The five aforementioned cases demonstrate how the courts handle the
problems created when letters of credit intersect with asset freezes. Engel II
and Semetex illustrate how a beneficiary that has performed its contractual and
letter of credit obligations can recover the contract price. Such a beneficiary
can recover from the confirming bank, irrespective from where or how the
confirming bank is reimbursed. Centrifugal illustrates how a beneficiary that
has drawn funds on a letter of credit but has not performed its obligations can
keep those funds pending litigation. Bergerco illustrates that a beneficiary can
not recover from an American bank unless that bank is a confirming bank.
Finally, Consarc shows that a beneficiary which has complied with its
contract, but not the letter of credit, cannot recover from either the confirming
bank or the foreign purchaser directly. The cases are logically consistent with
one another. They allocate the risks of losses according the parties'
contractual relationships and long-standing letter of credit principles. At the
same time, the cases allow international lending and international commerce
to continue because the expectations of what will happen when there is a
134 Id.
13 Id. at 1465.
"3 Consarc Corp. v. United States Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 71 F.3d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
137 Consarc, 71 F.3d at 912.
139 Id. at 913.
139 Id. at 914.
140 Id. at 915.
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foreign conflict remain the same. The courts' holdings are not just in
accordance with the law, but represent practical solutions to the problem of
an assets freeze. The exporters contracted out of their risk of loss, and the
confirming received a premium for their agreement to accept that risk of loss
and honor the letters of credit even when there is force majeure. Moreover,
the courts appeased OFAC in its desire to keep the Iraqi assets whole.
Part II: Proposed Iraqi Claims Legislation
While American exporters tried to collect under on their letters of credit,
Congress was considering legislation to solve their problems. As of this
writing, Congress is considering three bills to satisfy claims against Iraq.
These bills address two problems: (1) how to administer the U.N.
Compensation Program, and (2) how to liquidate Iraqi assets and distribute
them to claimants outside of the U.N. Compensation Program. The U.N.
program does not cover: (1) pre-August 2, 1990 claims and (2) post-August
2, 1990 claims where the loss, damage, or injury was the indirect result of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 4 '
The Secured Payment Act of 1993 was introduced into the Senate on June
16 1993. Its sponsors included Robert Dole, Oren Hatch, and Jesse Helms. 42
The single purpose of this Act was to amend the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act 43 so that letters of credit could be satisfied without
judicial intervention. Had this passed, a Semetex-type letter of credit would
have been honored without difficulty. This Act would have denied the
Treasury Department jurisdiction over frozen Iraqi funds earmarked to pay
letter of credit beneficiaries that (a) engaged in lawful trade with Iraq, and (b)
fulfilled their contractual and/or letter of credit obligations before August 2,
1990.'44 Accordingly, IEEPA would be amended to immediately release these
141 It must be remembered in analyzing the three pieces of proposed legislation that there have been
at least 1,400 claims reaching billions of dollars that are not recoverable under the U.N. program. Daniel
Magraw, Claims Against Iraq, 86 AM.SoC'Y OF INT'L L. 486 (1992).
142 S. 1119, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). It is interesting that the co-sponsors include 6
Democrats and 9 Republicans. The bill was sponsored by Senator Charles Robb, D-Va., to solve the
problem of the "half-dozen or so companies that were 'just a computer transaction away from getting their
money.' Their claims against Iraq total less than $30 million-a drop in the bucket against the $1.2 billion
in frozen Iraqi assets held in U.S. financial institutions." Richard Alm, Dallas Exporter Faces Quagmire
of Red Tape, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, January 24, 1994, at ID.
143 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977).
14 S. 1119, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1-3) (1993).
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particular frozen assets to the appropriate beneficiaries. 45 This simple
amendment would have saved numerous suits against banks and Iraqi entities.
However, after being referred to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee on June 16, 1993, no more action has been taken."4
One can only speculate as to why this bill has languished in the Senate.
Perhaps legislators concluded that honoring these letters of credit would
deplete more Iraqi assets than first suspected. Perhaps the Clinton
Administration announced it would veto the bill since it needed the Iraqi funds
to pay out other claimants, who, if not satisfied, would turn to the U.S. for
compensation. 47 Moreover, the banking community and the Treasury were
always against this bill." The Treasury Department opposed the "piecemeal
approach represented by legislation addressing only small segments of the
claimant community, such as the proposed Secured Payment Act of 1993."' 4
Because the Act would pay letter of credit beneficiaries even when no U.S.
bank had an obligation to pay, other claimants would go uncompensated.
More importantly, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen noted that the Act's
inconsistency with established international letter of credit principles would
make U.S. financial institutions less competitive because the Act would give
U.S. beneficiaries greater rights than beneficiaries in other countries. 50
In contrast, the proposed "Iraqi Claims Act of 1994'1' has a very different
agenda. In addition to adjudicating claims for the U.N. Commission, it
authorizes the validation and adjudication of claims of U.S. nationals not
compensable by the U.N. The bill gives first priority to non-commercial
claims of individuals arising directly from the invasion of Kuwait and the
1987 attack on the U.S.S. Stark.152 This represents a substantial amount. of
money that the U.S. government would otherwise have to pay as veterans'
benefits.
145 Id. at § 2(b)
146 Lexis-Nexis Bill Tracking Report, S. 1119, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
147 Letter from Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury, to Lee Hamilton, Chairman, House
Foreign Affairs Committee (Oct 7, 1993), in Marian Nash (Leich), Claims Settlement Legislation, 88 AM.




151 H.R. 3221, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This bill, sponsored by Lee H. Hamilton, D-IN, was
introduced on October 6, 1993. The corresponding Senate bill, S. 1401, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), was
introduced on August 6, 1993.
152 Id. at § 2(D) (1994).
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This Act gives the President the authority to liquidate all blocked assets
to satisfy claims of U.S. nationals and the U.S. government.' These claims,
assuming they are validly certified, will be paid out as follows. Each claimant
is paid the lessor of $10,000 or the amount of its claim. Non-commercial
claims arising from the invasion of Kuwait and the U.S.S. Stark incident will
initially receive $90,000. Then all claimants will be paid from time to time on
a pro-rata basis (i.e. the amount of their claim relative to the whole amount of
claims). Once all the principal is paid, pro-rata interest payments will be
made, and any money remaining will go to the U.N. Compensation Fund. Any
unsatisfied claimants will have the right to bring an action directly against the
Government of Iraq.'54 This legislation creates a structure similar to a
Bankruptcy Code,'55 in terms of creating a pool of assets from which to pay
out creditors on a pro rata basis with some creditors paid on a prior basis.
This legislation raises some interesting issues. First, it is quite
extraordinary that the United States gives its own claims the same priority as
individual claims. Among other liabilities, the United States has over the
course of the past three years paid out nearly $6 billion in loan guarantees
upon which Iraq defaulted. The government's claims may be as much as half
of the total amount of claims against Iraq, and the government hopes to recoup
as much of this loss as possible. 5 6 Second, it is almost certain that no
claimant will receive any interest payments. The State Department has
indicated that their "best estimate is that the volume of pre-war U.S. claims
will substantially exceed the value of the Iraqi assets blocked in the United
States."' 57 Thus, confirming banks that currently hold onto blocked accounts
can count that money as assets on their books, loan out more money, and make
considerable profit off the interest.'58 They will not have to reimburse
claimants with interest because no claim will ever be fully compensated.
Third, the United States Government allows U.S.S. Stark victims to collect
from Iraqi assets rather than, or also, from the United States government.
This legislation passed the House of Representatives on April 28, 1994,
and a concurrence in the Senate was requested on May 2, 1994. This bill had
153 Id. at § 4 (1994).
154 Id. at § 6 (1994).
155 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) et seq.
156 See infra notes 194-221 and accompanying text for a more in depth discussion.
15 Letter from State Department to Thomas S. Foley, in Warren Strobel, Iraqi Assets Won't Go
Around; Private Firms, Uncle Sam Vie for Dibs on Frozen Funds, WASH. TIMES, (October 20, 1992) at
Al.
158. See infra notes 222-236 and accompanying text for a more in depth discussion.
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considerable support from OFAC and the banking community. OFAC
Director Richard Newcomb testified that "there is no reason that one class of
unsecured creditors, such as those holding certain letters of credit, should rate
more highly than other unsecured creditors with receivables or breach of
contract claims."'59 A trade association comprised of international lenders also
testified that to grant a special status to letter of credit beneficiaries would
undermine international lending, because it would satisfy beneficiaries in the
absence of the proper documentation. The association argued that to allow
a special status to these exporters would "cast a cloud of uncertainty over the
willingness of U.S. banks to participate in letter of credit transactions
financing U.S. exports."' 6 However, while the House of Representatives
passed the bill and approved the Conference Committee report by floor vote
on April 28, 1994, the bill has yet to pass the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations.'
61
Senator Charles Robb, D-Va., who introduced and sponsored the Secured
Payment Act of 1993, introduced yet another piece of Iraqi claims legislation
into Congress on June 9, 1997.162 This bill, the Iraqi Claims Act of 1997, also
created an Iraqi claims fund, comprised of all Iraqi assets in the United States
and vested in the President, to be distributed by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission on a pro-rata basis.163 However, in contrast to the Iraqi Claims
Act of 1994, private claims would have priority over U.S. government
claims." Initially, this bill seemed very likely to pass both houses of
159 Iraqi Claims Legislation, 1994: Testimony on S. 1401 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ.
Policy, Trade, Oceans and Env't of the Senate Comm on Foreign Rel. (September 21, 1994) (testimony
of R. Richard Newcomb), in 1994 WL 515371 (F.D.C.H.). Newcomb emphasized that he believed this
legislation was better than a "race to the courthouse."
160 Iraqi Claims Legislation, 1994: Testimony on S. 1401 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ.
Policy, Trade, Oceans and Env't of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel. (September 21, 1994) (testimony
of Thomas Block), in 1994 WL 513060 (F.D.C.H.).
161 The Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment
concluded hearings on September 21, 1994. One service estimates the Senate Committee's likelihood of
passing the bill at 75%. Westlaw Bill Cast Report, H.R. 3221, 103rd Cong., 2d. Sess. (1994).
162 S. 856 105th Cong., Ist Sess. (1997). See 1997 CQ US S. 856 Summary. Upon introducing
the bill, Mr. Robb stated:
Mr. President, these frozen assets were blocked to prevent Iraq from using the funds to support
its aggression against Kuwait and its allies. That freeze - designed to hurt Iraq - is now
hurting American companies. Some of those firms were a mere electronic transfer, a keystroke
on a computer, away from receiving their payments when the emergency freezes were imposed.
After 7 years, it is time to act expeditiously in their favor.
143 Cong. Rec. S5413-02 at *S5420 - 21 (1997).
163 S. 856 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) §§ 1(a) and (b).
16 Id. at § 1 (c).
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Congress. Senator Jesse Helms, R-N.C., head of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, added the bill as an amendment to the 1998-99 Senate foreign
appropriations bill, which passed the Senate Committee. 16 The bill was also
added as an amendment to the 1998-99 House Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, which passed both houses of Congress in floor votes in
June, 1997 before going to the Conference Committee.
166
However, at this point, the bill became hostage to two of the most popular
political issues of the day-Gulf War Syndrome and the Big Tobacco Lobby.
The bill, although it called for the payment of private claims before the
payment of U.S. government claims, did not include within the definition of
"private claims" the claims of U.S. soldiers against Iraq. 67 Instead, the claims
of servicemen and servicewomen would be given the same priority as the U.S.
government's claims, which were subordinate to all other private claims of
U.S. citizens. 168 Apparently, not only would "private claims" encompass the
claims of the letter of credit beneficiaries of the type discussed in this article,
but it would also include the claims of many large cigarette manufacturers
who had exported tobacco products to Iraq. Many felt that there would be
very little money left for veterans if their claims were subordinated.169 There
was an immediate outcry from numerous veterans' groups claiming that Helms
and Robb, both from tobacco producing states, were favoring Big Tobacco at
the expense of veterans. z" Government officials also complained that the bill
165 S. 903, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) § 1601; Westlaw Bill Cast Report, S. 903, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1997).
166 Westlaw Bill Cast Report, H.R. 1757. 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
167 S. 856 § l(c)(l), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) states that "[aifter payment has been made in
full out of the Fund on all private claims ... , any funds remaining shall be made available to satisfy claims
of the United States Government against the Government of Iraq..." "Private claims" means "claims of
United States persons." S. 856 § 1(g)(2). The term "United States person ... does not include ... any
officer or employee of the United States Government acting in an official capacity." Therefore, because
U.S. soldiers are employees of the United States Government acting in an official capacity, they are not
entitled to "private claims" status with priority over claims of the United States Government. S. 856 §
I (g)(4)(B).
169 S. 856 § l(c)
169 One commentator stated that there was expected to be nearly $5 billion in business claims
against Iraq, of which half were agricultural export claims (i.e., tobacco), to be compensated from only $1.3
billion in frozen assets. Carol D. Leonnig, Veterans Fight Helms on Claims to Iraqi Assets, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER, Sept. 11, 1997, at A13. Therefore, there would be nothing left for veterans or the U.S.
government.
170 See John Hanchette, Helms Bill Favors Tobacco Firms Over Vets, USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 1997,
at 01 A (quoting one lawyer representing veterans as saying "[tlo cut out courageous gulf war veterans who
have been ill since the war, and to reward instead the somewhat ignoble profits of the tobacco industry,
would be something our country would be ashamed of.").
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would subordinate government claims. 1' Helms responded that the Veterans
Administration, not Iraq, has the responsibility of taking care of U.S.
veterans. 72 However, due to the political explosiveness of the issue, no
Congressman was willing to vote for such a bill, and the House
overwhelmingly instructed its members on the Conference Committee to
reject any inclusion of Iraqi claims legislation in the appropriations bill.'73
Moreover, two Congressmen recently informed Senator Helms that they
planned to introduce legislation in January, 1998 "granting priority to all
retired, reserve, or active duty members of the U.S. Armed Forces who may
wish to file claims against Iraq." 74
There is, however, one question that has not been addressed in any
discussion concerning these three proposed claims acts -the issue of a Fifth
Amendment takings. Suppose that Congress does pass some sort of Iraqi
claims legislation which distributes Iraqi assets on a pro rata basis? Bergerco
and Consarc will file claims based on their unpaid contracts, and the banks in
Engel II, Semetex, and Centrifugal will also file claims for reimbursement for
satisfying letters of credit. However, what if, but for Executive Order 12722
and such claims legislation, the letter of credit beneficiaries would have been
paid in full? If they are not fully compensated (an extremely likely
possibility), do they now have claims against their government because they
have suffered a Fifth Amendment taking by virtue of not being fully
compensated?17
Many Congressmen also came forward and expressed outrage at a bill that put private
commercial claims (especially tobacco companies) above those of Gulf War Veterans. See 143 CONG. REC.
H8164-01 (1997) (Speech of Rep. Doggett); 143 CONG. REc. H8262-02 (1997) (Rep. Doggett's Motion
to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 1757 to reject portion of bill relating to Iraqi Claims Act of 1997). Extensive
Congressional debate on this issue is located at 143 CONG. REC. H8271-02 et seq (1997).
171 Norm Brewer and John Hanchette, Daschle Asks Helms to Let Veterans Make Claims on Iraqi
Money, GANNET NEWs SERV., Sept. 11, 1997, 1997 WL 8836748. The Commodity Credit Corporation
expended about $2.5 billion in export guarantees to American farmers to export food to Iraq before the war.
See infra notes 165 through 193 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commodity Credit
Corporation's role in the arming of Iraq.
172 Leonnig, Veterans Fight Helms on Claims to Iraqi Assets, at Al 3 (quoting Helms as saying,
"[t]o include veterans in this legislation would set a dangerous precedent that veterans need to look to a
hostile power, rather than their own government, for the care, compensation and benefits they have
earned.").
173 Norm Brewer and John Hanchette, House Votes to Challenge Hlems on Persian Gulf Veterans'
Claims, GANNET NEWS SERV., Oct. 1, 1997, 1997 WL 8838219.
174 John Hanchette, Bill Would Let Vets Claim Iraqi Money, FLA. TODAY at 1OA (noting that Rep.
Doggett had urged the House to "'stand with GI Joe and GI Jane, who defended our democracy, not Joe
Camel, who exploited our children."').
17s There is a taking when claimants are without "access to any tribunal where they [could] be
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The answer appears clearer in a Semetex situation. There, in the absence
of a freeze order, after a court orders a confirming bank to honor a letter of
credit from its non-raqi assets, a bank could then reimburse itself from the
issuing bank's earmarked account for that purpose.'76 However, if the bank
is under a freeze order, it must then bring its own suit against the issuing bank,
obtain a default judgment, prove that Iraq has no property interest in the
earmarked funds, and then hope that OFAC will grant it a license to execute
its judgment.'77 Alternatively and more likely, since these assets are frozen,
the bank will file a claim with OFAC and wait until Congress passes the
claims legislation. In all probability, the bank will not recover the full amount
of its claim. However, it would appear that the bank would have an action
against the United States in the Court of Claims for the amount that it was not
reimbursed pursuant to any claims legislation.'
In a Bergerco or Consarc type case, however, the confirming reimbursin,
or advising bank is not liable to the beneficiary. A Bergerco or Consarc
beneficiary that obtains a default judgment against a foreign entity and then
seeks to execute that judgment has a different claim than a Semetex
beneficiary. Instead of claiming a contingent or vested interest179 as a
beneficiary of a letter of credit, the exporter-beneficiary can make a claim as
a judgment creditor against the Iraqi judgment debtor itself. However, if the
Bergerco or Consarc beneficiary was not fully compensated by the claims
legislation, it is unlikely that it could claim a constitutional taking in the Court
of Claims. This is because the beneficiary, as soon as it obtained a default
judgment against Iraq, no longer is a claimant with a property interest in Iraqi
funds. In contrast, a Semetex beneficiary can show a property interest in the
earmarked accounts, i.e., that it is has some interest in those funds comparable
to the Iraqi account party. The Semetex beneficiary could point to a specific
bank account and say, "we have an interest and/or claim to those specific
assured of enforcement of their contact rights." New York v. Republic of Palau, 680 F. Supp 99, 106
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
176 This is not an issue of subrogation. The confirming bank was not a surety, agreeing to pay the
beneficiary if the issuing bank would not pay upon presentment. See In re Davis, 115 B.R. 346, 350
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990); In re Carley Capital Group, 118 B.R. 982, 991 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990); In re
Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199, 204 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991); 11 U.S.C. § 509(b)(2) (1994).
17 Recall that the banks have taken a different route by lobbying the Treasury Department. The
Treasury has released roughly $100 million to a consortium of banks that have honored confirmed letters
of credit as confirmations. See infra notes 222-232 and accompanying text.
179 See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
179 Whether the interest is vested or contingent depends on whether the beneficiary has presented
the shipping documents.
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
funds." But a Bergerco or Consarc beneficiary, as a judgment creditor, is
attempting to attach a bank account just like any other creditor with a default
judgment against the Iraqi judgment debtor. Even though a Bergerco or
Consarc beneficiary can point to a specific account from which it was to be
paid, once it obtains a default judgment, it has no more right to that account
than any other judgment debtor. The Bergerco or Consarc beneficiary may
have an action in the Court of Claims, but to the extent that it is less than fully
reimbursed, it would seem that it has not suffered a constitutional taking
because it has not suffered a deprivation of a property interest. As a judgment
creditor, its specific property interest in frozen Iraqi assets would probably be
too remote to be considered property.80
Some would disagree that a Consarc beneficiary has not suffered a taking
such that he has no remedy in the Court of Claims. For example, Richard
Epstein's takings clause theory' would lead him to argue that even if a
Consarc beneficiary never obtained a default judgment, and claims legislation
awarded it less than what it would have received had it presented its proper
shipping documents prior to the invasion, there would still be a taking
requiring just compensation. Epstein took issue with Dames & Moore v.
Regan,' which held that a general creditor's claim is not a property interest
unless that claim is perfected."8 3 Epstein believes that the distinction between
perfected and unperfected liens is not a distinction between property and no
property. Instead it is a distinction not unlike that between vested and
contingent remainders; both are property, albeit in different forms and with
different values."8 4 Therefore, a Consarc beneficiary still had a contingent
property interest after it completes its contract but before it complies with the
letter of credit by presenting its shipping documents. If a court holds in favor
of OFAC, and any claims legislation has the ultimate effect of withholding
from a Consarc beneficiary less than full compensation of its claim, then it
probably has suffered a compensable taking by the government.
190 Commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court has rarely found a compensable taking
"unless the property interest involved is tangible, such as land, or vested, such as a right under a valid and
performed contract." Juliana J. Keating, Does the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause Mandate Relief for
Victims of Diplomatic Immunity Abuse?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 567, 591 (1990).
181 RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 224-28
(Harvard Univ. Press, 1985).
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In a Semetex-type case, Epstein's theory would lead to the conclusion that
a Semetex confirming bank has a contingent interest in the frozen Iraqi
account even if the letter of credit beneficiary never presented its shipping
documents to the bank.' If one assumes that the freezing orders prevented
the presentation of documents, then that confirming bank's interest would vest
but for the Executive Order 12,722. Contractually, the bank is entitled to
reimbursement from the earmarked funds on deposit in its accounts. In this
context, Epstein's theory is supported by Dames & Moore v. Regan.16 Prior
to Dames & Moore, President Reagan suspended all claims against Iranian
entities pending in U.S. courts and most attachments on Iranian property. This
was part of the hostage release agreement with Iran in 1981. One issue in
Dames & Moore was whether the President's suspension of the claims and
attachments was a taking of property violating the Fifth Amendment in the
absence of just compensation. The court majority felt that this question was
not ripe for review stating, "[w]e express no views on petitioner's claims that
it has suffered a taking.' ' 7 However, the Court did state that "we do not
suggest that the settlement has terminated petitioner's possible taking claim
against the United States."' 8 Moreover, in his concurrence, Justice Powell
wanted to:
leave [the] 'taking' claims [issue] open for resolution on a case-by-
case basis in actions before the Court of Claims...The Government
must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's foreign
policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by a
relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon which
our decision rests cannot, in the circumstances of this case, displace
the just Compensation Clause of the Constitution.8 9
195 A Semetex beneficiary would have a stronger argument that it has a property interest in a frozen
Iraqi account than a Bergerco or Consarc beneficiary for the purpose of takings analysis. See Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (finding that a mortgagee's lien constituted a property
interest under the Fifth Amendment); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (holding that the
government's destruction of a materialman's lien was a taking of a property interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment).
186 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
197 Id. at 689, n.14.
lag Id.
199 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 690 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); see also
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
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This language supports a Semetex confirming bank's argument that it
should get the difference between the amount of earmarked, blocked funds
and any award received pursuant to any claims legislation. The Tucker Act
provides that the Court of Claims shall have the jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded upon the
Constitution. 1"° Only if a remedy is not available in the Court of Claims is the
Takings Clause violated. 9' If the Tucker Act remedy was available in Dames
& Moore, then it would be available for a confirming bank who received less
through claims legislation than it would have from earmarked funds meant for
its reimbursement. This reasoning is consistent with Consarc, which stated
that, while Consarc could not enjoin the transfer of the frozen assets to the
Federal Reserve by claiming that that would be a taking, Consarc was free to
bring suit in the Court of Claims arguing that it was denied a property interest
that required compensation."9 One can only speculate as to whether the Court
of Claims would agree.
The issue of what constitutes a taking is especially delicate in this
situation, where the President is conducting foreign policy.. When a court
finds that there is an unconstitutional taking requiring just compensation, that
places a significant burden on the President's ability to make treaties or
impose assets freeze regimes. It is true that Dames & Moore found that the
"treaty exception" to the Tucker Act did not preclude the Court of Claim's
jurisdiction over the petitioner's takings claim.'93 But that determination was
only because the Government conceded that point at oral argument; thus it is
of questionable precedential value. 94 While the Meade doctrine'95 is
supposed to bar judicial reexamination of international arbitration awards,
even in the takings context, it seems that some courts have taken the hint from
Dames & Moore and reviewed the political decisions of the President's
19 Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1948).
191 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
192 Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 701 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
193 The Court in Dames & Moore was faced with a unique dilema-hampering Presidential
authority by invalidating the Algerian Agreement enjoining all actions against Iran pending in United States
courts, or giving sweeping power to the President. The Court was able to reach a compromise by upholding
the agreement with Iran while allowing slightly endorsing actions in the Court of Claims against the United
States. Phillip R. Trimble, Foreign Policy Frustrated-Dames & Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction, and
a New Raid on the Treasury, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 317, 324 (1984).
194 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688-89.
I" Meade v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 224 (1886).
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foreign policy.'96 It would appear that Dames & Moore did not mean to
implicate such a wide review of Presidential action. The courts have long
deferred to Presidential authority to conduct foreign policy primarily to avoid
political embarrassment and because of the belief that the executive and
legislative branches are the most appropriate government bodies to decide
these issues.
197
The scope of judicial review of foreign policy within the confines of the
takings clause has been most clearly addressed in Sardino v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. 98 Here a Cuban citizen residing in Cuba sought to
invalidate the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 99 which denied him access
to money in a New York bank account. The court found judicial support for
a wartime seizure of a non-enemy alien's assets' so as to prevent assets from
being used to assist an enemy government.20' Moreover, the court held that
it could apply those frozen assets to compensate Americans with claims
against Cuba without there being a takings problem. The court held, "if
Congress should ultimately choose to apply the blocked assets of Cuban
nationals to [compensate American claims against Cuba], the Fifth
Amendment [takings clause] would not stand in its way."'  This implies that
courts should not be quick to hold that a claimant has suffered a taking when
his assets have been frozen pursuant to a Presidential repines to a foreign
affairs crisis.
The question of how far a court should expand the takings analysis
remains unsettled. While a court might find that a Bergerco, Consarc or
Semetex beneficiary has a remedy in the Court of Claims to the extent it is not
fully reimbursed by ultimate claims legislation, there is a strong argument to
be made that a court should refrain from so finding. A court's review of the
foreign policy initiatives of the President on the basis of takings analysis only
19 See, e.g., Causey v. Pan American World Airways, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311-13 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that persons with rights against international air carriers limited by the Warsaw Convention have
actions in the Court of Claims, notwithstanding a statute barring such jurisdiction).
197 Trimble, supra note 156, at 363. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967). Cf. New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Youngtown Steel v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
'98 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
'99 31 C.F.R. 515.201 (1997) (issued pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App.
5(b)(l) (1997).
no The court found that the fact that the plaintiff was an alien did not afford him any less protection
than an American citizen. 361 F.2d at 111.
20 Id. at 112 (citing Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469,476 (1947)).
ld. at 113.
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hampers a President's ability to conduct foreign affairs. It seems that Dames
& Moore indicates otherwise, albeit only in dicta and in a concurrence.
Part III: OFAC's Interests
OFAC's position in these letter of credit cases is perplexing. Why does
OFAC intervene on behalf of Iraq, especially in motions for default
judgments? Why is OFAC so against the proposed Secured Payment Act of
1993and the Iraqi Claims Act of 1997? OFAC has always called for the Iraqi
assets freeze to be equitably administered, and OFAC contends that engaging
in piecemeal litigation fully compensates some parties at the expense of
others. But has this been OFAC's only goal in opposing the honoring of these
letters of credit? 3 At one level, OFAC has been acting earnestly as a trustee
to keep Iraqi assets together as one estate so that they can be equitably
distributed. However, it also seems that OFAC's positions have been driven
by two other interests: the President's political agenda and the special
relationship between the Treasury Department and the banking industry.
A. Iraqgate
OFAC, as part of the executive branch, is a tool of the presidency. Some
of these letter of credit cases were litigated prior to the November 1992
presidential election. A major election issue was Iraqgate. The issue was
whether the Reagan and Bush Administrations illegally assisted Saddam
Hussein in his weapons procurement programs and later covered up the extent
of this assistance. OFAC's "anti-recovery" posture was influenced by two
concerns: (1) to limit publicity resulting from an exporter's large recovery
against frozen Iraqi assets, and (2) to keep the frozen assets intact so that the
U.S. government, which guaranteed over $6 billion worth of loan guarantees
upon which Iraq defaulted, could recoup its own losses.
With the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1981, Ronald Reagan and George
Bush supported Saddam Hussein as a counter-weight to Iran. While Hussein
was an "odious figure," he had the potential to be a regional policeman. 4
The United States assisted Hussein in numerous ways, including military and
economic assistance and ignoring the extent of Hussein's nuclear weapons
program. When George Bush became President, he continued to fund
203 See supra note 29.
24 ALAN FRIEDMAN, SPIDER'S WEB xvi-xvii (1993).
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Hussein. Bush signed the National Security Directive 26 in October 1989,
which ordered government agencies to strengthen economic ties with Iraq. It
also called for other executive agencies to be stalled in their investigations of
Iraq's weapon procurement program and fraudulent foreign aid programs.
Quasi-CIA contractors obtained falsified end-user certificates to export
sophisticated weapons technology to Iraq. The White House assisted in covert
arms transfers with Saudi Arabia, Chile, and South Africa.0 5 Iraq was
prematurely removed from the list of countries sponsoring international
terrorism.2' Hussein received so much help from the United States that he
probably believed that the West would not care if he invaded Kuwait.2'
American troops, which later fought in Iraq, even faced American
military technology in the hands of the Iraqis." 8 After Operation Desert
Storm, the Bush Administration stalled Congressional inquiries into this U.S.
policy. High level White House officials met on a regular basis to discuss
methods to stonewall Congress and limit access to embarrassing documents. 9
The officials who disclosed that the Bush Administration may have known of
Iraq's nuclear weapons program, and yet still sold weapons to Iraq, were
fired.
210
Perhaps the greatest Iraqgate debacle was the Commodity Credit
Corporation's ("CCC") loan program. It provided financing for American
grain sales overseas. The CCC guaranteed 98% of loans made to foreign
entities. It would also guarantee a bank's discount of a letter of credit or
guarantee a confirming bank's promise to honor a letter of credit.21' With this
guarantee, the exporter could assign the letter of credit to an American bank
and obtain financing. In 1983, when diplomatic relations were re-established
with Iraq, Iraq was allocated $230 million in annual CCC loan guarantees. By
1988 this figure rose to $1.1 billion.212 At least $6 billion in credit guarantees
was extended through 1990.213 The Bush Administration took advantage of
a weakly managed CCC program so that Iraq could purchase grain and other
commodities for free, because Iraq's only "payment" were letters of credit.
2 Id. 33-34, 44, 63-64, 148.
'M Id. at 26.
M7 See Supra note 183.
2M William Arkin, U.S. Arms in Iraq, WASH. PosT, Oct. 24, 1992, at A20.
M9 FRIEDMAN, supra, note 182, at 207-16.
210 Id. at 178. (1993).
211 Kenneth Juster, The Myth ofIraqgate, 94 FOREIGN POL'Y 105-07 (1994).
212 Id.
213 Galli, supra note 21, at 241, 256.
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Iraq did not have to put up any money, since the CCC guaranteed the payment
of those letters of credit. Iraq's ability to obtain grain for free allowed other
Iraqi resources to go towards purchasing arms. Lenders and sellers conspired
with Iraqi purchasers to inflate the prices of grain. This enabled Iraqi
purchasers to get more CCC credits and thus purchase more grain. Then grain
shipments were diverted to other ports and exchanged for arms or sold for
cash that would then be used to purchase arms.2"4
The Bush Administration always pressed for Congressional approval for
a higher loan limits for Iraq. Federal Reserve Bank of New York president
Gerald Corrigan once stated, "if every citizen of Iraq had eaten the eggs that
had been officially exported, they would have had to eat 100 eggs every day
for three years." 2" Even after the Administration had clear evidence of Iraq's
nuclear acquisitions and practice of inflating grain sales prices,216 Bush
"pushed through" another $500 million in guarantees just a few months before
the invasion.27 Additionally, a secret 1983 State Department memo suggested
using the CCC to promote business with Iraq. It stated, "[a]lthough
commercial bank financing is beyond [U.S. government] control, we could
take some minor steps ... to swing loans for Iraq through friends in the
private sector."21
The Commerce Department routinely granted "dual-use licenses" for
products that had both military and non-military uses. When Consarc's bid
to build furnaces for Iraq was selected, the U.S. embassy in Iraq even telexed
Consarc a congratulatory note.219 Then, when Consarc relayed concerns to the
Commerce Department in February 1989 that the furnaces could be used in
nuclear reactors, the Commerce Department replied that its concerns were
unfounded. 2' In fact, the Commerce Department even sent Consarc a
brochure entitled "Helpful Hints to Exporters. '21 It was -only later, when
those same furnaces were about to be exported to Iraq, that the Defense
Department decided that those furnaces possessed nuclear capabilities.
214 FRIEDMAN, supra, note 182, at 112-14.
215 Peter Mantius, Let Debate on lraqgate Continue, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONsTrruTION,
May 1, 1994, at RI.
216 All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 11, 1993).
217 Jim Lobe, US: Democrats Want Special Inquiry on "Iraqgate", INTER PRESS SERVICE, July
9, 1992.
218 Mantius, supra note 192, at RI.
219 Liz Sly, Baghdad Sued over Foiled Deal; U.S. OKed Furnaces Earmarked for Nuclear Buildup,
Cl. TREB., Sept. 14, 1990, at CI.
220 Id.
22 Henry Rowan, Left Holding the Bad in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1992, at A25.
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Consarc alleged that the Commerce Department altered documents in order
to delete references to military applications of the furnaces.222
Once Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq repudiated its foreign debts, and
American sellers and lenders demanded the government guarantee the CCC
loans. To date, the government has paid out roughly $6 billion in loan
guarantees. The government's only chance at reimbursement comes through
the frozen Iraqi assets. It appears that OFAC feels pressure from the
Administration to keep the frozen assets whole for as long as possible until
Congress passes the claims legislation that treats government claims as equal
to individual claims. The Bush Administration once declared that its intention
was "to recover this [CCC] debt from Iraq's frozen assets."223 Moreover,
OFAC wants to prevent large awards that publicize past foreign policy
mistakes. Bill Clinton continues this strategy; because he does not want to
embarrass the Republicans whose votes he needs in the Republican controlled
Congress. Even Consarc's lawyer has stated, "the government's ultimate
purpose appears to be to take all the frozen assets to pay off illegal CCC
payments to foreign banks and leave nothing for U.S. businesses who were
encouraged by this administration to do business with Iraq."2"
The Atlanta branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro ("BNL") heavily
financed CCC guaranteed loans to Iraq. This branch also participated in the
Centrifugal loan transaction. BNL made many illegal loans through off the
books lending rarely scrutinized by the Federal Reserve or BNL's senior
management. In actuality, the Bush Administration gave BNL tacit approval.
The Justice Department claimed that BNL Atlanta branch manager,
Christopher Drougol, was the sole mastermind of these loans and brought
criminal charges against him for defrauding government regulators. BNL
made roughly $5 billion in fraudulent loans to Iraq, of which at least $2 billion
was guaranteed by U.S. taxpayers.225 The Federal Reserve called it "the
biggest bank fraud in U.S. history." Drougol alleges that senior BNL officials
and much of the U.S. intelligence community knew of his loan activities.
Drougol claimed that the BNL loans were part of a covert operation with
Italian and American officials to finance the secret arming of Hussein to tip
222 All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 20, 1992).
223 Warren Strobel, Iraqi Assets Won't Go Around, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at Al.
"24 Id.
2Z Brian Duffy, Stephen Hedges, and Elizabeth Pezzullo, Cover-Up, U.S. NEWS, Oct. 26, 1992,
at 51.
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the scales in the Middle East against Iran.226 Drougol introduced evidence
showing Bush's knowledge of the illegal loans as far back as 1987. Judge
Shoob, who had presided over Drougal's criminal case, stated after the trial
that:
I think the government entered into an effort early on to support Iraq
as a matter of national policy. They used the CIA and Italy to
effectuate that purpose. Many of the things that were done were in
violation of acts of Congress and U.S. arms export laws. They were
aware of the law, and they skirted it. It was an effort to arm Iraq, and
then, when things got out of hand, they didn't want that information
to come out.
22 7
The Justice Department originally brought a 347 count indictment
carrying a maximum sentence of 900 years.22' Drougol pleaded guilty on the
condition that he be allowed to make a public statement disclosing how much
the Bush Administration knew and approved of his lending activities. When
the judge agreed to let Drougal speak, the government surprisingly offered a
plea bargain of 60 counts if Drougol would delay his press conference until
after the November 1992 presidential elections.229 In July 1993, Drougol
subpoenaed George Bush, James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger. After this
bombshell, the prosecution offered Drougol a new deal-the government
would drop all charges if Drougol pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and
two counts of making false statements to the Federal Reserve.230 One
commentator has suggested that this plea bargain, coupled with leaks of a
Clinton Justice Department report that there was insufficient evidence to
support a Bush Administration conspiracy, was an attempt to appease
Republicans whose votes Clinton needed on NAFTA and health care
226 Stephen Pizzo, A Gift for George; why is Bill Clinton's Justice Department so Desperate to
Bury Bush's Iraq-gate Scandal?, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1993, at 62, 63-65.
7 FiEDMAN, supra, note 182, at 228-31. Judge Shoob became so convinced of a cover-up and
conspiracy, and was so angered by the prosecution, that he ultimately recused himself, claiming that he
could not be impartial.
223 United States v. Drougol, 91-CR-078 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (unpublished).
22 BNL Atlanta Branch Manager Pleads Guilty to Reduced Charges Regarding Iraqi Loans,
B.N.A. BANKING DAILY, June 4, 1992. It was at this time that Judge Marvin Shoob demanded a special
prosecutor, a call that was never heeded by the Justice Department. Shoob stated, "I do not believe for one
minute that Chris Drougol handled all these complex transactions on his own." Id.
2M Pizzo, supra note 203, at 62, 63-5.
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reform.23' Henry Gonzalez, D-TX, who had conducted a three year investiga-
tion of the BNL scandal, said of Clinton's handling of the investigation, "[I]
can't get up much enthusiasm. I fear he's a shallow man.
232
The White House and Justice Department also slowed down a
Congressional investigation. The General Accounting Office request for a
CIA briefing on the BNL affair was denied. Instead the GAO was referred to
the Justice Department, which relinguished only five out of thousands of
documents GAO requested.233 Senator Gonzalez, chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, issued subpoenas for Federal Reserve documents, but the
Justice Department withheld them. 23' Attorney General Barr refused calls for
an independent prosecutor.235
23 It In January 1995, John Hogan, assistant to Attorney General Janet Reno, completed a report
of the Iraqgate scandal. BNL Task Force-Final Report to the Attorney General, October 21, 1994
(published January 16, 1995), John M Hogan, Acting U.S. Att'y, No. District of Ga. This was to be the
definitive report on whether there were illegal loans to Iraq and whether there was a cover-up. The report
found no evidence of any secret arming of Iraq and subsequent cover-up, especially in relation to the BNL
scandal. Id. at 119. It is interesting to note that at one point Hogan states:
I have carefully considered whether to take testimony from former high level officials at the NSC and
the Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture, and concluded that it was unnecessary to do
so. Many of these officials were examined extensively by congressional committees. In addition,
[National Security Advisor] Brent Scowcroft, [Legal Counsel to President Bush] C. Boyden Grey,
[White House lawyer] Charles Nicholas Rostow, [Bush's Secretary of Commerce] Robert Mosbacher,
[Bush's Secretary of Agriculture] Clayton Yeutter, and [Bush's Deputy Secretary of State] Lawrence
Eagleburger were interviewed by the FBI in connection with the request for an independent counsel,
and Eageburger and [Secretary of State] James Baker were also examined by Judge Lacey. After
reviewing earlier statements, I concluded that they adequately covered the relevant subject matter.
No evidence has surfaced to contradict them, and there is no reason to believe they would now testify
differently than before. Under these circumstances, no investigative purposes would be served by
additional examinations. Id. at 91, n.71.
How an investigation can claim to be thorough and complete and yet not bother to interview the very people
alleged to be the engineers of an alleged conspiracy to cover-up and stonewall a Congressional investigation
is beyond this author's understanding.
At the same time, the Justice Department announced that it would not prosecute Honeywell
Corp. or Cargill Inc. for supposedly violating U.S. export laws by supplying military technology to Iraq
using BNL as a financier. Greg Gordon, US Wont Prosecute Honeywell or Cargill, STAR TRIB., January
28, 1995, at IA.
232 BNL Task Force-Final Report to the Attorney General, October 21, 1994, at 64 (published
January 16, 1995).
233 FRIEDMAN, supra, note 182, at 226. (provides a thorough investigation and review of the
Iraqgate affair and its cover-up by the Bush Administration).
2M I& at 206. ("'We are being obstructed blatantly, premeditatedly, and coldly,' charged Gonzalez,
'and in defiance of the plain constitutional prerogative of the Congress to know."') (quoting CONG. REC.
HI 114 (daily ed. February 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Gonzalez)).
235 Id. at 244.
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The government has also refused to pay approximately $370 million in
BNL loans and letter of credit confirmations guaranteed under the CCC
program, claiming that they were illegally obtained. BNL initiated a suit
against the government in the U.S. Court of Claims for approximately $350
million in CCC guarantees.236 Meanwhile, the CCC paid every other bank
claim for defaulted Iraqi loans.237 The Justice Department was forced to make
conflicting arguments in the Drougol criminal case and the BNL case in the
Court of Claims. In the criminal case, the Justice Department argued that
Drougol was a rouge manager getting kickbacks from Iraqi officials, without
official BNL knowledge. However, in the Court of Claims suit,23 the Justice
Department argued that BNL's Rome headquarters knew of the fraudulent
nature of the loans and helped coordinate them.239
Even President Clinton continued Bush's tough stance against any
admission of fault. This proves why OFAC, even under a new Administration
that could not be accused of covering its tracks, still takes a tough position in
the letter of credit cases. The government needs the money frozen by
President Bush as much as the letter of credit beneficiaries. This is the only
way to explain, for example, why OFAC appealed the remanded Consarc case
where the district court case held that Consarc was free to dispose of the
finished furnaces as it saw fit. It should be noted that just before the
presidential elections, Bill Clinton stated, "I give credit where credit is due,
but the responsibility was in coddling Saddam Hussein when there was no
reason to do it and when people at high levels in our government knew he was
trying to do things that were outrageous." 24°
As stated above, the only issue remaining was the approximately $350
billion in defaulted loans made by BNL, and for which BNL brought suit
against the U.S. in the Court of Claims. In February 1995, for reasons
unknown, the Clinton Administration settled with BNL, and paid BNL $400
million in satisfaction of the loan guarantee claim. This represented the final
payment on over $2 billion in loan guarantees for BNL-made defaulted Iraqi
loans.24
236 See Supra notes 197 and 213.
37 Mantius, supra note 192, at A5.
239 Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro v. U.S., No. 92-847C (Ct. Cl., filed 1992).
239 iza Kaufman, Plea Bargain leaves BNL Scandal Unexplained, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993,
at 10-14.
U40 All Things Considered (National Public Radio Broadcast, October 20, 1992).
24 Jeffrey Smith, U.S. to Pay $400 Million To Cover Iraq's Bad Debt, WASH. POST, February 2,
1995 at A9.
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The motivations and driving forces that influenced the Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton Administrations to support Saddam (officially and unofficially, legally
and illegally), to overlook his drive for regional conquest, and then to cover-
up and impede any investigations into their policies, may never be known.
But two things are certain. First, Presidents Bush and Clinton wanted all civil
and criminal litigation under wraps. This included the Drougol, the letter of
credit, and the Court of Claim cases. When Consarc won at the district court
level and OFAC had to issue a license to allow Consarc to execute on frozen
funds, the legal and banking communities were in a furor. United States
businesses championed the claim-adjudication process as a strategy to recover
funds quickly before Congress passed claims legislation.242 The only
publicity the OFAC wanted from these cases was that plaintiffs could not
recover from the frozen assets. Second, the government wanted the frozen
Iraq assets as much as the letter of credit beneficiaries. While there were only
$1.3 billion in Iraqi assets, the government's claims equaled all other pre-
invasion claims combined. Even though the government could, at best,
recover $600 million from the assets to compensate it for the $6 billion worth
of defaulted CCC loans to Iraq, it was still better than nothing. But the
government's hopes of getting that money could only be realized if OFAC
could keep the letter of credit beneficiaries from chipping away at those
assets. Any money that the government could recover for itself would soften
any publicity showing how ten years of misguided foreign policy towards Iraq
cost the U.S. government financially, militarily, and politically.
B. The Banking Relationship
OFAC's behavior was also driven by the close relationships between the
Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, and the banking industry. These three
groups have closely interacted with each other in such a way that creates an
institutional bias towards banks at the expense of the export community. This
favoritism might be one reason why OFAC refused to grant Consarc a license
to execute its judgment, or why OFAC often intervenes on behalf of Iraq on
motions for default judgments.
Banks that have confirmed letters of credit have been favored by the
Treasury Department in several ways. First, the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations
provide a limited basis for the unblocking of Iraqi government property where
242 See e.g., Galh, supra note 21, at 241.
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payment under a letter of credit is required to reimburse a mandatory and
binding payment obligation of a U.S. bank.243 Therefore, a confirming bank
in a Semetex scenario that must pay a letter of credit beneficiary from its non-
Iraqi assets may request from OFAC permission to reimburse itself from
frozen Iraqi assets in its account. The Treasury, as of September 1994, had
issued 74 specific licenses authorizing the release of almost $90 million from
blocked Iraqi accounts to reimburse confirming banks.' Of this, $76 million
"was released to U.S. banks to satisfy obligations of Iraqi banks or the Iraqi
government to reimburse the U.S. banks for payments the U.S. banks made out
of their own funds pursuant to letters of credit involving goods shipped to Iraq
before August 2, 1990."'  While OFAC wants to maintain the integrity of the
Iraqi assets against letter of credit beneficiaries, it is willing to reimburse
confirming banks.
Moreover, OFAC's regulations dictate that licenses for reimbursement
from frozen accounts should not be issued for beneficiaries in which Iraq
owns more than a 5% interest. However, OFAC granted a reimbursement
license for $470 million to the Gulf International Bank, a bank in which Iraq
used to own a 15% interest. 46 Also, OFAC granted a license to withdraw
funds from blocked accounts to the Arab Banking Corporation, of which
Libya, on the list for state-sponsored terrorism, owns a 26% interest.247
These regulations are discriminatory. If a U.S. confirming bank honors
a letter of credit, it may be reimbursed upon obtaining a license to execute
from OFAC. But if the bank refuses to honor a letter of credit unless out of
the frozen accounts, the exporter is forced to bring suit against the bank to pay
from its non-Iraqi assets, as in Semetex. The Treasury has released money to
reimburse banks honoring letters of credit, but those banks have an obligation
to pay out of their own funds anyway. Thus, it appears that the "legal
principle that justifies releasing frozen Iraqi assets to U.S. confirming banks
is no more compelling than the legal principle that justifies releasing frozen
Iraqi assets to U.S. exporters." 248 The Treasury has cited a "policy" (not
reflected in its regulations) which allows a confirming bank that honors a
3 Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 575.510 (1991).
2" Iraqi Claims Legislation, 1994: Testimony on S. 1401 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ.
Policy, Trade, Oceans and Env't of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel. ( September 21 1994) (testimony
of Thomas Parish), in 1994 WL 513034 (F.D.C.H.), at 4.
2AS Id.
2M Colin MacKinnon, Consarc Wins, MID. EAST EXEC. REP., Jan. 1993, at 4.
27 Id.
2 Id. at 6.
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letter of credit to be reimbursed if that bank had an earmarked account to
reimburse itself (i.e., specific collateral) as opposed to just a legal obligation
to be reimbursed from the issuing bank.2"9 But this is an arbitrary distinction
that denies U.S. exporters payment. Unlike the confirming banks, exporters
have had no opportunity to earmark funds to pay for their exports. Perhaps
this was a "sweetheart deal"25 between OFAC and the banks.
Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen justified this policy by stating that
confirming banks have a binding legal obligation to pay a beneficiary who has
fulfilled the terms of the letter of credit; this obligation exists whether or not
the confirming bank is reimbursed from the Iraqi issuing bank.25 1 He contrasts
this with an advising bank, which has no such legal obligation to honor a letter
of credit even if the beneficiary fully complies.252 But that does not explain
the bias in favor of U.S. banks. When banks honor a letter of credit, they may
be reimbursed from their earmarked account. But if a letter of credit
beneficiary cannot perform its obligations because of force majeure, all it gets
is what future claims legislation may give it. If a letter of credit beneficiary
cannot get a confirming bank to honor the letter of credit and it cannot afford
to go to court the way Semetex and Engel did, it will submit its claim to
OFAC and, most likely, receive a small award. This race to the courthouse
still remains, because the government wants the beneficiaries to sit back and
wait for legislation and then get 10 cents on the dollar. If those beneficiaries
bring suit, they will probably win, and the confirming banks will have to pay
from their non-Iraqi assets. It is not until after such time that the banks may
be reimbursed from the asset pool if the Treasury approves the appropriate
license. This still results in less money available for other U.S. claimants. As
a result, the Treasury's discrimination gives the exact incentives that the
proposed claims legislation and assets freeze regime is supposed to prevent.253
29 Id. at7.
250 Id.
251 Letter from Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury, to Lee Hamilton, Chairman, House
Foreign Affairs Committee (Oct. 7, 1993), in Marian Nash (Leich), Claims Settlement Legislation, 88 AM.
J. INT'L L. 314, 318 (1994).
252 Id.
23 One might argue that the government's preference of the banking industry over the export
industry violates the equal protection clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (finding an equal protection component in the Fifth Amendment due process clause). However, the
Supreme Court's current position is that in the area of socio-economic legislation, a statutory classification
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental Constitutional rights must be upheld
against equal protection challenges if there is any reasonably conceivable state of acts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
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Another example of the close relationship between the banks and OFAC
relates to Bush's October 21, 1992 order instructing all financial institutions
holding frozen Iraqi assets coming from the sale of oil or petroleum related
products after August 6, 1990 to transfer that money to the Federal Reserve.2u
This amounts to roughly $700 million, about half of all frozen assets. This
money is supposed to go towards the $200 million that is to pay for various
U.N. inspection programs pursuant to U.N. Resolution 778.255 A week before
the announcement, Treasury officials met with representatives of six major
banks holding the most Iraqi assets. Rather than having to transfer all $700
million, the government agreed that the banks only had to pay $200 million on
a pro-rata basis. 56
A final example of favoritism is that while all parties concerned are
waiting for Congress to pass claims legislation, the banks that currently hold
the frozen assets are profiting off the interest that those assets generate. Banks
can loan out more money because they can record those frozen accounts as
assets. It is true that the proposed Iraqi claims bills will allow for the payment
of interest to claimants. 2 7 However, interest is only paid after all the principle
of a claim is paid. There is no way that claimants will receive anywhere near
to all of their principle. In effect, the banks have free money to loan.
Conclusion
No one would disagree that the Reagan and Bush Administrations pursued
an unwise policy in supporting Saddam Hussein during the 1980's. How
legally sound was this support, and whether evidence of this support was
suppressed for political gain, may never be known. But while the political
winds of foreign policy may change direction every few years, there has been
one constant: international trade and commerce through letters of credit. One
can speculate as to why OFAC took the position it did; whether it was to
dampen publicity that would come from a successful suit, or whether it was
2M Bush Orders Transfer of Iraqi Assets to Federal Reserve Bank, 9 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 1846,
1846-48 (1992).
2 Id. These assets were from the sale of oil already in transit before the sanctions were imposed
and from oil payments that could not yet be made to Iraq and were then frozen. Most of the oil is sitting
in Saudi Arabian tanks or pipelines. See Executive Briefing, 15 MIDDLE EAST ExEc. REPORTS 6 (1992).
2 These banks include Arab Banking Corp., Gulf International Bank., Chase Manhattan, Bank
of America, Union Bank of Switzerland, and BBL-Bank of Brussels Lambert. Bush Orders Transfer of
Iraqi Assets to Federal Reserve Bank, 9 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 1846, 1846-8 (1992).
2 See supra note H.R. 3221, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., § 6(a)(4) (1994).
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to retain the frozen Iraqi assets to satisfy the government's own claims against
Iraqi stemming from their loan guarantees. But one thing that is clear. The
courts were able to decide these cases in a way that took into account the
interests of all the parties involved-the exporters, the banks, and the
government-and then fashion a result that was the best compromise between
these positions. The exporters, by virtue of requiring letters of credit,
contracted out of the risk of non-payment; they should receive the benefit of
that bargain, so long as they completed their contractual obligations. At the
same time, however, those exporters that had not performed their contractual
obligations could not expect to get the benefit of their bargain. Thus, while
Consarc obtained a default judgment against the Iraqi buyer, it could not
execute that judgment against a blocked account because it did not perform its
letter of credit obligations. The courts recognized the importance of letters of
credit to international trade while at the same time realizing the importance of
an assets freeze regime to the foreign policy of the United States. Hopefully,
there will not be another foreign policy debacle like Iraqgate for years to
come. If there is, exporters should rest assured that the courts will allow as
few inroads as possible upon the sanctity of letters of credit.

